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 This study examined the purpose of United States international broadcasting form 
its inception, and emphasized the changes in structure that have helped the broadcasters 
to fulfill that purpose.  The study used a three-pronged methodology involving personal 
interviews, historical perspectives and participant observation. 
 The survey of the historical narratives regarding the Voice of America and the 
findings from personal interviews with key members of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors staff revealed an ongoing debate about the purpose of a government-funded 
broadcaster.  The two prominent sides are those who want international broadcasting to 
serve an advocacy role versus those who want it to be a tool for explaining and discussing 
the policies of the U.S.  The first group follows a more traditional model of propaganda, 
while the second relies on the methodologies of western journalistic media to define its 
role. 
 Recommendations based on the findings are included, as well as some general 
observations to spur further research in the area of content analysis and media effects 




 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
1.   Introduction           1 
 
2. Methodology         12 
      
3. Historical Narrative        17 
 
4, Findings         45 
 
5. Conclusions         67 
 
Reference List          83 
 




BBC  British Broadcasting Company 
BBG  Broadcasting Board of Governors 
BIB  Bureau for International Broadcasting 
DSB  Defense Science Board 
FIS  Foreign Information Service 
IBB  International Broadcasting Bureau (United States) 
MBN  Middle-East Broadcasting Networks  
  Radio Sawa, al Hurra TV, Radio Free Afghanistan, Radio Free Iraq 
OCB  Office of Cuba Broadcasting 
OSS  Office of Strategic Services 
OWI  Office of War Information 
PDC  Public Diplomacy Council 
RFE  Radio Free Europe 
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
  the combined operations of RFE & RL 
RL  Radio Liberation from Bolshevism  
  shortened to Radio Liberty in 1963 
USIA  United States Information Agency 
VOA  Voice of America 
   
 
 1
 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Throughout the history of the participation of the United States in governmental 
international broadcasting, there has been a conflict between opposing views of its 
necessity and purpose.  First, is there even a need for the U.S. to have an international 
presence on the airwaves?  Is our participation in the dialogue of the world such that we 
need to speak directly to the people of it?  Traditional diplomacy moves at a snail’s pace, 
of necessity. Responses to official opinions can take months or longer, as every aspect of 
the response must be thought out and discussed by the concerned parties.  A hastily 
written dispatch can cause a war or long-term economic isolation.  Therefore, the 
ponderous movement of the official diplomatic process may be more suitable to the long-
term foreign policy goals of the nations involved in the discussion. 
 However, broadcasting serves as a direct link with the citizens of a nation, as a 
directed (or “public”) diplomacy.  It appeals to the masses rather than to the elite few in 
the diplomatic community.  One side effect is that such rapid access to media channels 
often forces officials to respond rapidly to a crisis that is in heavy news coverage, though 
the situation or area may not be a priority for the policy of the nation.  A Somalia or 
Rwanda may capture attention for no apparent reason beyond the humanitarian appeal.  
In fact, Taylor says that the agenda set by the media may bring issues to public salience 
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that cannot be resolved, leaving the viewer with an unsatisfied, “Someone should do 
something!” response.1
 Bickham points out that, “Reactions to the priorities of the newsroom are unlikely 
to yield a coherent or sustainable foreign policy.”2  This dependency on the commercial 
media to determine salience of issues may account for the lack of a universal policy for 
the U.S. international broadcasters; because they are inherently news organizations, their 
focus must and will shift with the changing news cycle and stories.  Because they feed on 
agency news from the Associated Press and other prominent news services, they will be 
subject to the short-term focus issues that plague normal newsrooms.  In addition, the 
policy direction from the White House will be inconsistent if the administration follows 
news story emphasis as a gauge of public opinion. 
 Secondly, assuming there is a need for this instrument of statecraft (as this thesis 
does), should U.S. international broadcasters play a public diplomacy advocacy role, 
broadcasting the position of the administration and advocating for its policies, making the 
broadcasters a true propaganda agency?  Would the international broadcasters of the U.S. 
better serve as exemplars to nations where rulers do not allow free press, serving as 
“surrogates” to the local media?  Alternatively, should a federally-funded international 
broadcaster provide a channel through which to tell America’s story to the world, not as 
an advocate, but by presenting the national conversation?   
                                                 
1 Philip M. Taylor. Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945. p. 96 
2 Bickham, Edward. “Playing to the heart of the Nation”. Spectrum. Autumn 1993, p.3, cited in Taylor 
(1997), p. 96. 
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 International broadcasting serves foreign policy best when it holds reasonable and 
responsible discussion about the policy goals of its host nation, and/or those of other 
nations as a true dialogue with the world.  In its most suspect form, it may advocate for 
those positions that it deems most advantageous to the goals of its host nation; however, 
reasonable and balanced discussions will lead to a broader base of counsel from which to 
draw for a well-founded and wise policy. 
 The danger in seeking to balance the news for a government-funded broadcaster is 
the tendency to want to be sure that the opposite sides of an issue are represented, no 
matter how strange or unfounded they may be.  Thus, a frequent accusation of U.S. 
government broadcasters is that they always sound negative on the policy issues of the 
U.S. because editors seek to balance the coverage to avoid being called a propaganda 
machine, and to protect the credibility of the agency and its employees.  As Bruce 
Gregory of George Washington University says, “Credibility is the coin of the realm,” in 
statecraft.3
 As we shall see, on this second point there is much more debate than that 
surrounding the first one.  Some suppose that if the purpose of a “Voice of America” is to 
demonstrate a free press and tell America’s story to the world, then it must remain free 
from government interference.  Others believe that a government-funded broadcaster 
should serve an advocacy role, with some going so far as to suggest a cabinet-level 
position for the directors of the broadcasters, a direct link to the government.  They see 
                                                 
3 Bruce Gregory. Personal Interview. March 2005. 
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the current U.S. services as an international version of the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting that is in need of restructuring to meet the role of advocate.   
 This debate addresses the very core nature of propaganda.  Taylor says that 
propaganda is “a process of persuasion distinguished [from] other processes deploying 
information – such as advertising and even education – by the question of intent.”4 Thus, 
an ample paraphrase of the well-known communication question explains the study of 
propaganda in this way: “Who says What to Whom with what Intent (desired effect)?”  
The word propaganda is nearly always applied in a pejorative sense to a nation with 
which another nation finds itself in opposition.  However, for purposes of academic 
discussion, the truest sense of the word is applied here, i.e., the spreading of particular 
perspectives through mass media, or “propagating” an ideology.  It is a value-neutral and 
the most inclusive term that is available to describe the work of international 
broadcasters, and is not used in the normal (pejorative) sense in this research. 
 Most administrators, frontline workers, politicians, and average citizens 
vehemently will deny that any U.S. government-funded international broadcaster 
participates in propaganda.  By relying on the negative connotations of the word, 
detractors seek to harm the credibility of their counterparts by charging them with 
broadcasting propaganda.  Meanwhile, those same nations participate in very similar (if 
not identical) practices, and refer to it as “objective” coverage.  It is often only name-
calling that is irrelevant to the issues at hand.  Rawnsley cites one U.S. government 
broadcasting official who says, “You are not going to kid anybody . . . anywhere when 
                                                 
4 Taylor, P. M. (1997), p. 16 
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you have an official broadcast or broadcast with a political objective that you are there 
simply by accident – you will be considered and identified at all times as a propaganda 
station and I don’t necessarily think that that necessarily has a pejorative taste to it. . . .”  
With or without its pejorative “taste”, no one nation would be thrilled to be convicted of 
propaganda by an international court of public opinion. 
 The vision of purpose held by the federal leadership and administration has 
shifted between the two views, which has led to sporadic and reactive structural changes 
throughout the history of U.S. international broadcasting.  Voice of America (VOA) 
research analyst Kim Andrew Elliott says, “The VOA has experienced shifts in priorities 
and policies usually at the beginning of every new administration and has yet to develop 
the image of consistent reliability enjoyed by the BBC [British Broadcasting 
Company].”5  As seen in Figure 1, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG, current 
organizational parent of U.S. government non-military broadcasters) must oversee 
multiple organizational forms, both federalized and private corporations within the 
agency.  This disparate structure can cause confusion over purpose, because private and 
federal entities require different levels of input from the Board and therefore management 
must approach each one differently.  This will be explained in more depth later in this 
paper. 
 These views have played out through history in a structural context, leading to the 
current debate over the privatization of the broadcasters and definition of their 
operational issues of mission.  The researcher applies a three-pronged methodology to  
                                                 
5 Elliott, K. A. “Too many voices of America” Foreign Policy. Winter 1989/90. p. 119. 
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Figure 1:  from BBG FY 2005 Performance & Accountability Report, p. 9 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
provide a broad understanding of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.  The historical 
perspective demonstrates how arguments of the past and case studies of successes and 
failures illuminate and provide context for the current debate.  The participant 
observation provides an “insider” look at the daily operations of the news and 
performance review aspects of two BBG entities, not available by any other means.  It is 
a minor portion of this paper, because the issues dealt in focus during the internship were 
those of content, rather than structure and purpose.  The in-depth interviews with key 
BBG officials provide a more defined sense of how the administration of the Board and 
its constituent services view the purpose and mission of the organization.   
 This study adds to the ongoing discussion of the mission and vision of the BBG 
by looking at how these different views have led to divergent/disparate structures of the 
international broadcasters.  The final pursuit is to suggest how a unified structure (BBG’s 
 7
“single system” idea, covered in the “Findings” chapter) could be achieved that would 
allow for the flexibility mandated by the founding legislation, security of the journalistic 
mission, and still meet the long-term policy goals of the United States as a federally-
funded agency.  The approved three-pronged approach bolsters this study, and 
consolidates existing information with new perspectives gained by this methodology. 
 It is both correct and natural to point to the events of September 11, 2001, in the 
United States as a demarcation point in the history of U.S. international broadcasting.  
However, the reasons the ongoing, post-9/11 change is able to occur so rapidly include 
the creation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1994; and folding the former 
parent of the international broadcasters, the United States Information Agency, into the 
State Department in 1999.  These two major shifts in strategic communication policy are 
reflections of the decades-long effort to define and pursue the role of international 
broadcasting interests of the United States.  Since its very beginning, U.S. international 
broadcasting has worked to define its role and relationship to foreign policy and this 
search for identity divides neatly into three epochs.  The first is the early work done prior 
to and during World War II; the second covers the Cold War, which ended in the late 
1980s.  The third period is that launched when the State Department absorbed the 
operations of the United States Information Agency, except for the international 
broadcasters, who became an independent agency for the first real time.  This third period 
is the focus of this research, and is the new “struggle to get it straight,”6 an attempt to 
                                                 
6 Heil, 2003, Chapter 17 partial title 
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create an agency that most effectively and efficiently accomplishes the goal of winning 
hearts and minds. 
 Within each period, the research looks at the lessons of history, how previous 
directors and parent agencies have responded to major shifts in U.S. foreign policy, and 
how they handled necessary changes in focus.  Each time the “core business” of 
international broadcasters has changed a struggle has ensued within the services involved 
to understand the role played by radio and (now) newer media.  Does radio fall into the 
“propaganda” arm of strategic communication, or is it a device of goodwill or “public 
diplomacy?”  Is there a median purpose for it?  This discussion occurs daily among news 
writers, editorial staffs for language services, and numerous gatekeepers within the 
services.  The overall goal of the Voice of America is most easily defined because its 
purpose is codified in its Charter, Public Law 105-277 (see Figure 2).  The Voice of 
America has this legislated purpose, and its sibling services have adopted its charter 
verbatim; it is the central focus of this research.  Its place within the overall BBG and 
strategic communication programs is defined by discussion of new and changed services 
offered by the United States, specifically Radio Sawa and other services to the Middle 
East and Asia. 
 The reason for this emphasis on the Middle East and parts of Asia is because they 
are the location of most of the emerging services.  These newly formed or restructured 
services indicate a heightened interest of the United States and its foreign policymakers 
in that region.  The Broadcasting Board of Governors is required to reflect the long-term 




To protect the integrity of VOA programming and define the organization's mission, the 
VOA Charter was drafted in 1960 and later signed into law on July 12, 1976, by 
President Gerald Ford.  It reads: 
The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with 
the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the 
attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of 
America (VOA) broadcasts:  
1. VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news 
will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive. 
2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will 
therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American 
thought and institutions. 
3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also 
present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies. 
(Public Law 94-350) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2:  VOA Charter 
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balancing the objectivity and truthfulness that are equally requisite.  Thus, these research 
questions guide the research that follows: 
 RQ1: What is the purpose of having a “Voice of America” international   
  broadcaster? 
 RQ2: How and why has its purpose changed over the years? 
 RQ3: What structural changes have been made to adapt to the changed   
  purpose? 
 RQ4: Is there now a clear vision for the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
  which percolates throughout the entire agency, and if so, what is it? 
 
 This qualitative study seeks to understand the current state of the major 
constituent part of the BBG, the Voice of America (VOA) and its supporting arm, the 
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).  A qualitative study was chosen because of the 
changing nature of the broadcasters.  Though qualitative research is not the preferred 
method of the author, it offers a unique perspective into the workings of the organization 
that cannot be gained from quantitative or outside analysis.  Especially with the shifting 
nature of the form and function of the IBB and Voice of America, it is better to capture a 
moment of experience to help explain what “is” within the organization, before offering 
suggestions for future direction. 
 The rationale for undertaking this study is that over $671 million U.S. taxpayer 
dollars go to fund this service each year (FY 2007), with funding expected to continue 
rising.  Like many strategic communication efforts, it goes largely unnoticed by the 
public, and most Americans would be unable to explain what the Voice of America is.  
However, these efforts are largely responsible for the image of the United States and its 
people portrayed around the world.  In a time when anti-American sentiment is more 
obvious than usual, this attempt to sway public perception abroad is a critical element in 
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securing positive attitudes.  If the mission is unclear and the structure is ineffective, then 
serious changes need to be made to remedy the situation.   
 It is also necessary to address these issues because the agency must know which 
master it has to serve.  If it is a mouthpiece, its mandate should clearly state such a 
function; if it is to be the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, International Version, it 
should know that clearly.  This work is an attempt to understand and explain how the 
agency has worked in the past and is now functioning, and to offer suggestions for further 




 Significant portions of the interviews and research for this work have focused on 
the current controversy over the organizational structure and search for purpose of the 
Voice and other related BBG services.  Within these discussions reside issues of new or 
changed purpose and typical organizational change issues.   
 Three specific methods for research have been used to create a broad picture of 
the international broadcast environment.  These are:  
 1) historical narrative analysis and perspectives;  
 2) participant observation; and  
 3) interviews with key BBG and IBB officials.   
 The historical perspective offers a clear delineation of problems that may still be 
experienced or resurface periodically.  As seen in the historical narrative, the current 
issues are not new to the services. 
 Participant observation offers the unique perspective of an “insider” through 
sharing in the day-to-day experiences of the staff.  As an intern in the IBB Office of 
Program/Performance Review, I participated in weekly language service reviews and 
senior management meetings.  In conjunction with the Office of Performance Review, I 
created a data set of story usage from raw data provided by the Central News division of 
the Voice of America.  I then sorted and reconciled this data to create a benchmark for 
future analysis of story usage.  Finally, I submitted a findings report, written with IBB 
analyst Richard Dow, which was included in the Central News review for 2004, and 
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referenced again in the 2005 review.  This work helped me to gain a clear picture of how 
VOA’s coverage is spread out across the globe.  Participation in the weekly language 
service reviews gave me a sense of the priorities (some of them changing) of the senior 
management of the IBB, and added a depth of understanding that hopefully permeates 
this writing.   
 Interviews offer a chance to have specific questions answered by those who are 
most qualified to give correct information, and bring a broad-based picture of the 
philosophy of the current administering officers.  These open-ended questions were asked 
to allow for a breadth of response that would not be feasible with a multiple-choice 
questionnaire or closed-ended questions.  This allows observation of emerging patterns 
that guided the remainder of the questions.   
 There naturally are limitations to this research.  The very nature of qualitative 
research is that it is subjective at its very root.  This does not preclude its use, as 
qualitative methods can invoke a “truer” sense of what actually “is” within the piece of 
the universe we are trying to gauge.  Keyton says, “Qualitative research recognizes that 
everything in the communication environment influences everything else. . . . Thus, 
qualitative methods generally do not seek to ascertain causality.”  This indicates a true 
acceptance of systems theory.  We cannot quantitatively examine everything that “is” in a 
system at a given moment, for the same reason physicists cannot measure the location 
and velocity of an atomic particle at the same moment.  Therefore, the best qualitative 
methods immerse the researcher (in various ways) in the environment of the data itself, 
allowing a more accurate understanding of existing narratives and research.  For instance, 
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the administrative structure of U.S. non-governmental international broadcasting is quite 
easily drafted on paper, and is the subject of much of this present research.  When the 
researcher immerses himself for a time in the environments of two of the subordinate 
organizations (International Broadcasting Bureau and Voice of America), the reasoning 
and practice behind divisions becomes readily apparent in a way that is not available to 
the quantitative researcher via his methods.  Ultimately, qualitative research puts a “warm 
face” on the research data.  Keyton says,  
 [An advantage] of qualitative research [is] being able to study 
communication features or functions taken for granted . . . The limitations . . . 
include difficulty in accessing or gaining entry to the desired communication 
environment, having participants change their normal behavior due to the 
presence of the researcher, [and] having the researcher be the sole interpretive 
lens of the interaction.”7    
 
 It is incumbent upon the researcher, then, to collect significant supporting 
information for the conclusions attained.  “Researchers use triangulation, or the use of 
several kinds of methods or data, to further validate their outcomes and results. . . . The 
first method of triangulation is data triangulation.  By using a variety of data sources in 
one study, researchers are more confident about their findings and conclusions. . . . ”8
 In this case, participant observation proved very effective, because the author was 
able to participate in daily activities that were otherwise inaccessible to the research team.  
The limitation of such data collection is the short-term nature of the internship.  A six-
week internship does not allow the researcher to get completely inside the mind and 
culture of an agency or its managers.  However, it does give a clearer picture than mere 
                                                 
7 Keyton 2001, p. 77  
8 Keyton 2001, p. 78-79 
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reading of histories, or numerical analysis of questionnaires.  This participation gave the 
author a greater sense of what people meant in those histories, adding scope to the 
observations and recommendations made in this work.   
 Interviews are effective means of data collection, even when not conducting 
quantitative conversation analysis.  The interviewees were people who are currently 
directly involved with the management and administration of the U.S. International 
Broadcasting Bureau, VOA, and BBG functions, or tied to its predecessor organizations.  
For example, Bruce Gregory from George Washington University is a former employee 
of the USIA, while Brian Conniff was the Executive Director of the BBG (Chief of Staff) 
and acting Head of the IBB.  These men are fully qualified to address the concerns of the 
research questions with accuracy and discretion. 
 The limitation of the interviews is that we may expect some interviewees to be 
armed with “pat” answers that are rehearsed and do not really answer anything.  Another 
limitation is imposed by the Institutional Review Board, which requires that all recorded 
interviews be accompanied by a signed Informed Consent letter.  One respondent was not 
willing to go on record, due to reactions to that individuals previous statements.  This 
individuals perspective add to the overall perspective of this paper, and utmost care has 
been taken regarding inclusion of this person’s comments, with strict observation of IRB 
rules, and verification by other sources of what this respondent said.  The mentions of 
these comments deal with broad concepts.  Of special note, this individual is a “frontline” 
employee. 
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 There are issues within the organizational structure of which the author and 
research team are unaware, and cannot address.  These factors limit, but do not disqualify 
any observation made. 
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3.  HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
 
We are living in an age when communication has achieved fabulous importance.  
There is a new decisive force in the human race, more powerful than all the 
tyrants.  It is the force of massed thought-thought which has been produced by 
words, strongly spoken.   
        (Robert Sherwood) 
 The United States was the last major country to have its government broadcast 
around the world, but was not new to propaganda efforts.9   A Committee on Public 
Information (CPI) was created in April of 1917 as an internal propaganda attempt to build 
support for American entry into World War I.10  There were foreign and domestic 
branches of the CPI, presaging later structures of U.S. information programs.  The early 
leader of the CPI was George Creel, who used films and print media to talk about 
America.  He believed that these programs were “to teach the motives, purposes, and 
ideals of America so that friend, foe, and neutral alike might come to see us as a people 
without selfishness and in love with justice.”11  This was in line with the current Voice of 
America’s charter.12  The CPI was short-lived, and dissolved in 1919, having not found 
                                                 
9 See discussion in Shulman (1990), Wasburn (1992), and Fejes (1986) for more on prewar efforts of the 
U.S. and other nations 
10 Krugler 2000. 
11 Wolper 1991, cited in Krugler 2000. 
12 See Figure 2 for VOA Charter 
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favor with prominent Republican Congressmen who disliked Creel,13 and who detested 
even the appearance that something might be propaganda.   
World War II 
 The Voice of America became the subject of national debate before it began 
broadcasting on February 25, 1942.14  Accompanying congressional antipathy were the 
bad memories of Germany’s World War I propaganda15 and the prevalence of the “bullet 
theory”16 of media at that time.  Hitler’s use of propaganda media leading up to and 
during World War II had seemed to demonstrate that a speaker could plant ideas directly 
into a listener through mass media like shooting a bullet into a victim.  These things led 
many in the United States to loathe the idea of government-sponsored information 
programs.  However, the Office of Coordinator of Information’s William J. Donovan17 
believed that VOA and other information efforts should not be news services, but “a 
weapon using news ‘as guns fire bullets,’” to soften up the foreign public for the 
military.18  Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy held that the Army needed 
propaganda as much as its air and ground offensives.   
                                                 
13 Krugler 2000, says that Creel had written articles against several Senators, and they were out for 
vengeance, which may in part explain the dissolution of CPI in 1919. 
14 Writer John Houseman is credited with starting an official entity called “the Voice of America” which 
began broadcasting on this day.  However, U.S. information programs predate this broadcast. 
15 See Wasburn 1992 pp. 13-23 for discussion. 
16 The “Bullet Theory” is sometimes called the “Silver-” or “Magic- Bullet Theory” and says that an 
audience will believe any message, regardless of truth-value, if it is repeated long enough and in enough 
places through multiple media channels. (See Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory for 
discussion.) 
17 “Wild Bill” William J. Donovan was the head of VOA’s first parent agency (though it was not yet called 
VOA) within the military’s covert operations Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  He was a decorated WWI 
hero, and founder of the CIA’s predecessor.  This may shed light on his continued efforts to make 
international broadcasting a military operation.  
18 Donovan, cited in Shulman 1990 
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 Private radio owners disliked the idea of a government station.  They were still 
looking for ways to make an international shortwave service profitable, and felt that a 
move by the government into shortwave was the first step into heavier and tighter 
regulation of their industry.   
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially rejected propaganda as a valid 
instrument of foreign policy, but relented in the face of growing enemy broadcasts.  The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, changed the tone for all U.S. information 
programs, and allowed for a reorganization of services.  On December 26, 1941, 
presidential advisor Robert Sherwood19 cabled William Donovan to take charge of a 
government radio station, “the Voice of America.”20  Acting on directions from the 
president, Sherwood formed the Foreign Information Service (FIS) under the Office of 
Coordinator of Information (OCI).  OCI used funds that required no accounting for their 
use, allowing for covert operations.  The Foreign Information Service later became the 
Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI), with VOA as its main 
component.21,22  
 Elmer Davis23 was the first director of the Office of War Information.  Shulman 
says, “ . . . Roosevelt appointed Davis not for his organizational abilities but rather in 
order to reassure Americans that the new propaganda and information agency would be 
                                                 
19 Robert Sherwood was Roosevelt’s speechwriter and a successful playwright who saw the need for 
international information campaigns.   
20 Shulman 1990 
21 Executive Order 9182 consolidated information programs with VOA as a component, and moved FIS 
and the overseas branch from the military budget to congressional oversight as an executive agency. 
22  As part of OWI operations, it contracted with the BBC to share medium-wave facilities in Britain, and 
took over transmitter sites behind advancing Allied forces.  OWI also created the American Broadcasting 
Station in Europe (ABSIE) that operated out of London studios.  (Dizard 2004). 
23 Elmer Davis was a conservative CBS news commentator and newspaper writer who was responsible for 
forming and directing the Office of War Information. 
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trustworthy and very American. . . . The president, as always, acted with politics in mind 
rather than daily administrative or a grasp of the art of propaganda.  Davis had begun his 
career in print journalism . . . but he was best known as a radio announcer and 
commentator."24  
 Robert Sherwood was at odds with Donovan, who wanted propaganda to go forth 
without the necessity of truth, as a subversive force in the war.  Sherwood desired a BBC-
modeled service25 in which the government only had a say in the funding, but not directly 
in its content.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff backed Donovan and wanted to fold VOA into 
the military.  Donovan was partially placated when Roosevelt placed OWI program 
content under the scrutiny of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.26  Operational control in war 
theaters was “subordinated to tactical military needs” under direct military command.27  
Thus, “the high-minded ideological crusade gave way to targeted objectives” and a 
harsher tone for the Voice of America.  28   
 This fight over the purpose and control of U.S. information programs led to 
administrative chaos within VOA.  Shulman says, “The consequences of reorganization 
went beyond those of bureaucracy and administration, however, to the very nature of 
                                                 
24 Shulman 1990 
25 An example of the BBC model comes from Nelson (1997, p. 12): “Lord President of the Council Herbert 
Morrison, said it would be unthinkable for the BBC to broadcast to Europe at the taxpayer’s expense 
doctrines hopelessly at variance with the foreign policy of the government.  But it would be equally 
undesirable that the Foreign Office should itself become responsible for the foreign services.  He explained 
that the government had come to an arrangement with the BBC whereby the BBC would accept the 
guidance of the Foreign Office on the ‘nature and scope’ of its foreign language services and the 
relationship between the two of them would be very close. ‘But once the general character and scope of the 
service has been laid down, the BBC will have complete discretion as to the content of the services 
themselves.’”   
26 Executive Order 9312 on March 9, 1943.  
27 (Dizard 2004) 
28 Dizard notes that this pattern repeated during the Vietnam War (p. 32).   
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propaganda. . . . They had to answer the question, Was [sic] the function of propaganda 
to arouse listeners to take direct action, or was there another, more inchoate but 
informational objective?  What, put another way, was the relationship between Voice of 
America propaganda and American foreign policy?"29  
 The leadership and propagandists came up with different answers.  Elmer Davis 
believed in the existence and then in the effectiveness of the "bald fact." He viewed the 
OWI as primarily a domestic service, charged with telling the American people about 
how the government was conducting the war.  "For Davis, however, news was effective 
because America was such a great nation.  He believed that if the United States portrayed 
itself honestly, it would provide a beacon of light unto the world.  He argued, moreover, 
that only straightforward news would create credibility. ‘We must establish at once . . . in 
the minds of our own people and the rest of the world that the United States Government 
will tell the truth day in and day out about all developments.'"30
 At the time of Elmer Davis's leadership, the OWI propagandists wanted to use it 
as a front against Nazism and fascism, and as a tool to shape US foreign policy; this 
meant broadcasting material that went against the stated policies of the United States and 
the State Department.  In one example of this, the VOA editors endorsed the French 
Resistance, while the State Department and president backed Vichy France.   
 As demonstrated in the case of the propagandists' continual support for positions 
not favored by the U.S. government, the OWI journalists used its assets to wage the war 
of ideas in the manner they saw fit, rather than operate as an arm of U.S. foreign policy.  
                                                 
29 Shulman 1990 
30 Shulman 1990 
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Throughout 1943, small battles over administration symbolized the fight for who should 
control the Overseas Branch.  Among these battles was the banning by the State 
Department of cooperation between its own regional desks and the language services of 
OWI.  This meant that radio producers could not consult with language and regional 
specialists within the State Department to improve and focus their content.  Regional and 
language services would wait lengthy periods for advice, because State did not have the 
news mentality of getting information into the hands of an audience in a timely manner.31   
 In the fall of 1942, leading up to the Allies’ “Torch” campaign into Africa, 
Donovan (then as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and head of the Office of 
Strategic Services) raised the need to determine who would take care of pre-invasion 
propaganda.  Military planners gave Donovan a new way to “pry overseas propaganda 
loose from the Office of War Information.”32  The Joint Chiefs appointed him to control 
overseas propaganda three months later.   This move angered many at VOA, who 
resented Donovan’s repeated attempts to wrest control of propaganda.    
 These differences in defining the purpose eventually led to the resignations of the 
first shapers of the VOA propaganda machine between November of 1942 and February 
of 1944.33  Shulman says,  
 The leaders of the Overseas Branch believed they could make a difference 
in more ways than through shaping the political beliefs, or even actions, of their 
audience.  Through the power of their words, they wanted to influence the foreign 
policy of the State Department in what was, from their perspective, the best way 
they could work to help the United States win not only the war but also the peace.  
They hoped to redirect foreign policy through the power of their propaganda.  
                                                 
31 See discussion in Shulman 1990, p. 60ff. 
32 Shulman 1990 
33 Shulman, 1990, p. 38ff, 75 
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However, they met, head on, the resistance of the president, the State Department, 
the military, and Congress.  The ensuing political blaze consumed Sherwood, 
Barnes, Warburg, and Johnson in its flames.34   
 
 The firestorm of resignations led to OWI Chief Elmer Davis presenting the case 
of the propagandists before the president.  Roosevelt was preoccupied with planning for 
the war, but later issued an executive order that reasserted OWI control of overseas 
propaganda.  It was too late for the founders of the VOA. 
 This administrative chaos and fight for control illuminate the underlying struggle 
to determine the necessity and nature of a government international broadcaster, and the 
United States was not the only nation to deal with such problems.  The debate only 
intensified as the Japanese surrender in August of 1945 ended World War II.  Nations 
sought to determine the role of radio during a “peacetime” existence.   Though all sides 
clearly saw the benefit of broadcasting during the war, opposition was such in the U.S. 
that the House Appropriations Committee cut the Office of Coordinator of Information 
(including VOA) from the 1948 budget.  “The committee thought the government should 
not be in the news business and suggested [some] alternatives . . . The president and 
secretary of state intervened, and the Senate subcommittee restored about one-third of the 
funds.”35  The restoration of funding was tainted by a congressional mandate to spend 
two-thirds of the new budget to pay private broadcasters, such as NBC and CBS, to 
produce content for VOA.36   
                                                 
34 Shulman 1990, p. 92 
35 Nelson 1997 
36 Krugler 2000 
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 The State Department closed the Office of Coordinator of Information, and 
founded a new Office of International Information and Educational Exchange in its stead.  
OWI was abolished less than two weeks after the Japanese surrender, and its operations 
were rolled into the State Department as the Interim International Information Service, 
with VOA as a component.  Dizard notes that the OWI was subject to closure because the 
public was not familiar with its operations.37  This is an interesting observation in light of 
the Cold War scrutiny that soon followed. 
The Cold War Years38
 ‘Cold War’ and ‘psychological warfare’ are unfortunate terms.  In reality there 
 is a psychological aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic or military 
 policy and action.  This implication should receive more attention both in the 
 planning and execution stage of policy.  But not to the exclusion of other vital 
 factors.  Except for propaganda, there are no psychological warfare instruments 
 distinct from traditional instruments of policy. 
     (from the report of the Jackson Committee, June 8, 1953) 
 After struggling for over two years with its post-war purpose, a financially 
crippled VOA redirected its attention to the so-called “Cold War” and the global assault 
on communism and fascism.39   In September of 1947, a joint congressional committee 
visited twenty-two countries in five weeks, led by Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New 
Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R- South Dakota).  Mundt had previously been 
an outspoken critic of U.S. overseas information programs, but he and the committee 
“returned home convinced that America needed to energize its international information 
                                                 
37 Dizard 2004 
38 The years of 1945-1989 are conventionally referred to by this name. 
39 In a funny twist, according to Nelson (1997, p. 11), William Donovan may have been responsible for 
starting the cold war by issuing directives changing intelligence and information targets to include Russian 
interests in the Balkans.  As Russia’s Radio Moscow increased its attacks on U.S. containment efforts, the 
VOA responded by launching its Russian service on February 17, 1947.    
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programs.” 40,  41  VOA historian Alan Heil believes that the increased attacks by Soviet 
radio combined with this visit to cause the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act (P.L. 402, 
properly known as the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act) in late-
January 1948.  With this Act, the Voice of America obtained firm footing as a part of 
U.S. foreign diplomacy and information programs.42  This allowed VOA to rebuild some 
of its human and technical infrastructure, and forbade the dissemination within the U.S. 
of the information it was broadcasting.   George V. Allen became director of the State 
Department information programs and used his experience as a diplomat to gain 
budgetary increases that helped establish the long-term health of the program. 
 At that time, the major networks (CBS, NBC, etc) produced nearly 75 percent of 
the content broadcast by VOA, until some significant stories changed the mind of the 
Congress and Senate.  One program carried information touting races in which Indian 
maidens wore only feathers.43  NBC produced that show, but no one at the network 
viewed the program except the Cuban author and Venezuelan supervisor.44  Other stories 
included those calling Brigham Young a “primitive priest” and Quakers a “social 
problem.”45  Nelson says, “The House and the Senate opened investigations into the 
Voice’s activities.  They criticized the lack of supervision and checking of program 
                                                 
40 Heil 2003; see also Krugler 2000 
41 It is interesting to note that the conflict over the VOA FY 1948 budget coincided with the debate over the 
Smith-Mundt Act.  Subcommittee members were reticent to restore funding to VOA’s parent agency, and 
many representatives and senators did not want to establish permanent international broadcasting.  There 
was the possibility that VOA would be established in the Smith-Mundt Act, but would have its funding 
pulled by the appropriations process.  This would have made Smith-Mundt moot. (Krugler 2000) 
42 Heil 2003, p. 47 
43 This statement was/is actually true, but the story did not clarify that they have clothes made of feathers 
that fully cover their bodies.  It implied that they were naked but for a few feathers strategically placed. 
44 Nelson 1997 
45 Dizard 2004, p. 47 
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content. . . .”  This was exactly that for which the leadership of VOA had hoped, and, 
“Congress quickly ordered the network contracts canceled and script-writing authority 
restored to the VOA.”46  
 The American media widely criticized the VOA for taking the government’s tone 
in its broadcasts during the early Cold War years, even though it claimed to be telling the 
plain truth.  Congress encouraged editors to refute the claims of foreign radio more 
quickly, and encourage resistance by broadcasting suppressed news to the totalitarian and 
satellite countries.   
 Meanwhile, the State Department pushed VOA away from a full and fair 
projection of the U.S., making it another arm in the battle for face, and seeking to make it 
a propaganda department.  Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett47 said the 
purpose of VOA was “keeping the Soviet bear so busy scratching his own fleas that he 
has little time for molesting others.”48   
 In early 1950, “Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada almost succeeded in getting the 
program abolished . . . Barrett said, ‘No one could prove that last year’s funds had been 
well spent by producing a cage filled with 7,000 Russians who had deserted 
communism.’” 49 However, the June 25 start of the Korean conflict gave the VOA new 
life and purpose, with President Truman laying down a harder line to guide propaganda 
efforts.   
                                                 
46 Dizard 2004 
47 Barrett is the founder of Columbia Journalism Review, and had worked for OSS in propaganda during 
WWII.  He became Assistant Secretary of State on February 16, 1950 (Nelson 1997, p. 37). 
48 Barrett 1953, cited in Nelson 1997 
49 Barrett 1953, cited in Nelson 1997 
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 The Congress, in its wisdom, saw that forcing VOA to submit to strict, direct 
government policy control had jeopardized the service’s credibility and effectiveness.  It 
became necessary to develop ways to broadcast in a more strident tone, but in a less 
conspicuous manner.  “General Lucius Clay, former commanding general of the U.S. 
occupation forces in Europe [explained]: ‘When I left Germany, I came home with a firm 
conviction that we needed . . . a radio which would speak to each country behind the Iron 
Curtain it its own language, and from the throats of its own leaders who fled for their 
lives because of their beliefs in freedom.’”50  In December of 1949, the Radio Committee 
of the Free Europe Committee51 became Radio Free Europe. 
 Thus were born Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation from Bolshevism (later 
shortened to “Radio Liberation” then to “Radio Liberty” in January 1964).52  These new 
stations became “surrogate” radio stations, broadcasting as though they originated in the 
targeted country or region.  Frank Altschul53 of the Free Europe Committee said that a 
key purpose of the new service was “‘to provide a channel over which American citizens, 
not subject to the restrictions which hamper a government agency, could say things on 
their own responsibility which it was considered desirable to have said, but which the 
Voice of America, as an agency of government, was not in a position to say.’”54  It was 
acceptable for these stations to broadcast harsh criticism of a particular policy of a nation, 
                                                 
50 Holt 1958; cited in Nelson 1997 
51 The Free Europe Committee, Inc., was the representative body that launched RFE, and was made up of 
“the major religious, economic and political groups” which had fled the Soviet advances (Nelson 1997). 
52 War of the Black Heavens is an excellent discussion of American efforts during this period. 
53 Frank Altschul “was the driving force behind the idea of using radio” to give a voice to exiled leaders 
and refugees (Nelson 1997). 
54 Altschul 1950; cited in Nelson 1997 
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because each new service operated to demonstrate how a free press system should work 
in countries where no such freedom of the press existed.   
 RFE operated as an independent corporation, funded initially by the government 
and private contributions.  The private contributions were relatively small, but were used 
to conceal direct government and intelligence involvement in the funding, tone and 
policies of the station.  Nelson says the young Central Intelligence Agency kept the 
nature of RFE and RL covert because of possible opposition from U.S. legislators, not so 
much as from foreign sources, demonstrating the continued domestic battles that have 
plagued U.S. international broadcasting. 
 The wording of the Smith-Mundt Act made possible the existence of the “private” 
station, by emphasizing private production of content.  Historian Michael Nelson55 says, 
““RFE and RL were founded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as surrogate 
domestic broadcasters, designed to be like local radio stations of the target countries, and 
to deliver lots of local news.  The BBC and VOA did not pretend to be local radio 
stations.  They were national broadcasters, speaking for their home countries but with 
strong international content. . . . The Voice of America was part of a department of the 
American government.”  RFE and RL broadcast into Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union respectively.  The CIA had a monetary advantage over VOA services, because it 
had access to funding for which it did not have to account.  This led to tension between 
the State Department and the CIA, who had different ideas about reasonable 
psychological warfare operations. 
                                                 
55 1997, p. xiv 
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 As a private entity, RFE was free to broadcast what it willed, even if that went 
against the stated policies of the government.  This allowed for addressing critical issues 
in a more direct and aggressive manner.  C. D. Jackson then-president of the National 
Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE, RFE’s founding organization) said, “We can play 
tricks, we can denounce, we can take chances, we can act fast, all things that an official 
propaganda agency cannot do.”56  However, the station’s charter did not allow the blatant 
disregard by broadcasters of U.S. foreign policies or of the feelings of those who 
supported them (namely, the citizens of the United States). 
 RFE’s necessity and continuation were in doubt from the earliest days.  
According to Nelson, “Altschul regarded RFE as no more than an experiment.  Five 
weeks after broadcasting had started he was prepared to consider the possibility of 
closure.”  The service did not close, though it was nearly two years before issues of 
policy control were resolved, with the Americans winning the struggle against exiles who 
wanted to agitate for revolution.  During that time, the CIA consolidated control again 
under the deputy director, and refused further orders from the State Department on 
policy.  The CIA formed the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in April of 1951, which 
began an analysis of RFE in December.  The evaluation initially concluded that 
continuance of RFE was “at least highly desirable and advisable,” that it should be 
ramped up to broader reach, and that greater care had to be exercised in policy control at 
the operational level.  Mallory Browne was Assistant Director of Evaluation and Review 
of the PSB, and believed that VOA appealed mainly to an elite audience, while RFE had 
                                                 
56 Cited in Krugler 2000, p. 159.  Current VOA Director David Jackson disagrees with this strongly (see 
Findings chapter). 
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peasants and workers as its main audience.  These targeted audiences are very similar to 
those sought by the services today. 
 Radio Liberty had a more difficult start, and the government funded it without 
private contributions.  A council of five different Russian factions, and six non-Russian 
eastern European interests failed to find a cohesive vision for the service, and formed the 
Amcomlib57 without a complete decision on goals.  Amcomlib was incorporated in 
January of 1951, and launched Radio Liberation from Bolshevism on March 1, 1953, in 
the midst of the McCarthy hearings discussed later.  Krugler points out that the refugees 
were never fully coordinated at RL.     
 The rapid expansion of the VOA and State Department budgets as part of the 
Truman “Campaign of Truth” led to congressional wariness at the use of funds.  The 
ensuing examination brought about several investigations of VOA operations and 
transmitter construction projects.  Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada launched an 
investigation within the Internal Security Subcommittee, with the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on the State Department, looking for communist sympathizers.  Krugler 
suggests that this investigation may have been a reprisal against VOA for its decision not 
to build transmitters in Fallon, Nevada, as requested by McCarran.  The study focused on 
claims by Slovak separatists that known communists influenced Czech service members 
and a VOA information specialist.  This also may have been an attack with ulterior 
motives, because Czechoslovakia had not yet separated into the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, and internal tensions were palpable.   
                                                 
57 The founding committee of RL was first called, “American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the 
USSR, Inc.” and became known as “Amcomlib” (Nelson 1997) 
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 “A recurring claim [during this investigation was]: the VOA could never be the 
true voice of America as long as the State Department managed it.”58  A sizable portion 
of this claim arose from the difference in State Department and VOA timetables for 
getting out information.  The State Department was likely to spend hours or days in 
carefully scripting policy guidance on an issue that might require immediate attention 
from the broadcasters.  This sometimes led to a disruption in daily operations.  A delayed 
response in guidance would result in old news and fewer listeners.  A hasty assumption 
about U.S. policy on an issue would create a false impression in the world, and create 
friction between the services, the parent agency, and the congress. 
 In an attempt to combat this problem, Senator William Benton led an 
unsuccessful attempt to detach VOA from State in 1951, and suggested that VOA could 
be more effective as a separate entity with a quadrupled budget.  He pointed to 
inefficiencies caused by the rapid expansion, and lack of support from State as reasons 
for suggesting this change.  Then-Secretary of State Acheson did not support the 
separation, and considered alternative reorganizations that would not detach information 
programs.   
 Among these options was advice from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs Howland Sargeant [sic] that President Truman should appoint an 
independent commission to review the operations of the information program.  Another 
suggestion involved the establishment of a semi-autonomous agency within State that 
                                                 
58 Krugler 2000 
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would continue to connect on matters of policy.59  This suggestion led to planning for an 
alternative when Benton brought his ideas to the floor.  The primary goal of the planned 
agency was to keep the broadcasters and information programs within State.  The general 
sense was that an internal program made simpler the solution to problems of guidance 
and field integration.  Benton’s plan faltered as Senator Karl Mundt sought House 
support to bring VOA into the TV age by promoting a “Vision of America” service.60  
This delay gave State the time to develop its own internal agency with major changes in 
overall structure, called the International Information Administration.  International 
information programs were placed under a new administrator.  However, VOA policy 
remained firmly in the hands of State Department officials.  Domestic public affairs 
information remained under the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.   
 The new structure failed to provide a fix for the continuing problems.  Additional 
complications with the expanded building of transmitters to reach the “Iron Curtain” 
countries brought down the fury of the U.S. House and Senate on the leadership and 
organization.  Disagreements by technical experts over the best locations for transmitters 
accompanied congressional attempts to influence the choice of locations and contractors, 
and a lack of proper funding for a major expansion of transmitter capability known as the 
“Ring Plan” proposed in 1950.  This plan was intended to surround, or “ring” the Soviet 
Union with transmitters that could reach the entire landmass.  One contractor, Murry 
Brophy, served as a location consultant while bidding for the construction rights. 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 The proposal failed in the House of Representatives, and it was the early 1980’s before VOA television 
came into firm existence, under the USIA. 
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 The Senate approved “a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations 
Committee to examine the IIA’s operations” in June 1952.61  J. William Fullbright 
originally chaired this subcommittee, but relinquished his position when the Republicans 
regained control of the Senate in the November 1952 elections.  Bourke B. Hickenlooper 
became the namesake for the subcommittee.  Hickenlooper had traveled with the Smith-
Mundt contingency in 1947 and supported the Act, but had since developed doubts about 
the operations of VOA.  These concerns included the ever-present suspicion that 
communist sympathizers were prevalent in the agency, continuing problems with policy 
channels between New York and D.C., and the integration of VOA with Foreign Service 
officers.  Interestingly, Hickenlooper noted from a personal trip that people received the 
BBC and Radio Moscow more easily than VOA, a problem that plagued VOA from its 
very first days on the air.  This was due to a stall in the “Ring Plan” mentioned before.  
These problems led to a request by the subcommittee for an extension to its investigation.  
The Senate extended the deadline to June 1953, causing it to overlap with the exploration 
of the Senate Government Operations Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, known as the McCarthy hearings.   
 In February of 1953, four days before the Senate voted to extend the 
Hickenlooper investigation, Senator Joseph McCarthy launched an investigation into the 
alleged infiltration of VOA and its parent agency, the State Department,62 by Communist 
sympathizers and so-called “fellow travelers.”  McCarthy had lodged similar complaints 
                                                 
61 Krugler 2000, p. 180 
62 The McCarthy-led committee did not subject Radio Free Europe to hearings.  Perhaps its non-
governmental status shielded it as intended by its founders (Puddington 2000). 
 34
against the State Department in 1950.  In this case, McCarthy better used the electronic 
media and news organizations to his benefit.   
 Apart from any legitimate concerns the Senate committee had, agency employees 
used the hearings to get back at bosses or fellow employees with whom they had 
disagreements.63  Even though the hearings found no clear proof of Communist 
employees, the scathing criticism and (apparently) unfounded scrutiny endured by the 
leadership crushed the morale of the employees of VOA, caused the resignation of 
several key leaders, and led to the suicides of at least two.  Continuing cuts in staffing 
and funding had already taken their toll on the Voice, and the management had to bleed 
funds from long-standing services to continue operations in the newly important Soviet 
bloc.64  McCarthy moved on to investigating the Army, as the VOA worked to pick up 
the pieces and deal with other investigations into its activities.   
 Another group looking into the structure of information programs was 
Eisenhower’s President’s Committee on International Information Activities, known as 
the Jackson committee.65,66  The goal of this inquiry was to determine whether VOA 
belonged in the State Department.  Eisenhower also created a President’s Advisory 
Committee on Government Organization (the Rockefeller committee), tasked in part with 
                                                 
63 See Heil 2003, Dizard 2004 for discussion 
64 The BBC was also considering cuts to its overseas budget during this time.  Its budget requests had been 
slashed by 11-percent in FY 1952.  Anti-jamming efforts had taken a toll on the financially challenged 
BBC, as it struggled for five years after the war to rebuild its capital investments (Nelson 1997).  The BBC 
did not lose any services during the 1952 crisis, but did have to limit any expansion plans.  The leadership 
had a close relationship with British government’s Foreign Office, and consulted with them about scope 
and content of services 
65 Kruger 2000, p 198 
66 The findings of the Jackson committee sometimes reflected the findings of Rockefeller, but often were 
internally inconsistent.  The Hickenlooper findings favored a more autonomous IIA, but not its separation 
from State (Krulger 2000, pp. 206ff).   
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considering possible reorganization of the International Information Agency.  Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles was more interested in the implementation of policy and felt 
the information programs did not belong in State.   
 The Rockefeller committee recommended the establishment of the United States 
Information Agency, a separate agency that would report directly to the president, and 
administer both the information and cultural programs.  The educational exchanges 
remained under the Department of State.   
 The USIA was not an entirely new concept.  Nelson Rockefeller had begun 
information programs and cultural exchanges with Latin America in 1940, to help win the 
minds of those he felt were being subverted by German propaganda.  His exchanges 
included art works and economic assistance, and operated under the auspices of the 
Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA).  CIAA broadcasted to Latin 
America by leasing time on U.S.-based commercial transmitters.  The basic structure for 
operating the CIAA became the footing for USIA. 
 USIA formally came into existence on August 1, 1953, with a mandate to 
consolidate all its operations in the same city, Washington, D.C.”67  This major change in 
organization allowed for a lessened amount of direct governmental content control within 
VOA.  By moving all policy decisions to D.C., the agency addressed the earlier policy 
guidance issues in a new structure that allowed for more journalistic freedom and 
required less time to get correct and representative information to air.  As Krugler68 
notes, this new agency gave VOA a new start after the excruciating examination it had 
                                                 
67  Heil 2003; see also Dizard 2004, Krugler 2000, pp. 197ff 
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endured since its earliest days.  As the USIA launched, VOA took a step in earnest 
towards an autonomous existence in an independent agency.   
 For the VOA, this became a relatively calm era.  There were continuing conflicts 
between Congress, State, Defense, and the agency, but these could not compare in scope 
to the bitter infighting and struggle for direction of the early days of Voice of America 
programming.  Policy guidance was still firmly in the control of State, but the content 
creators were at greater liberty.  President Eisenhower repeatedly supported the USIA in 
a very public manner, and lobbied for budget increases, helping to raise the morale of the 
personnel.  When the president and Senators including Lyndon B. Johnson attempted in 
1957 to merge USIA back into State, John Foster Dulles blocked the move, showing his 
continued lack of interest in doing more than monitoring the information programs.  
Dulles also continued to express an isolationist viewpoint by rejecting the importance of 
foreign public opinion in shaping U.S. foreign policy.69  This lack of acceptance of input 
by USIA into policy led to an introspection and internal reorganization.  The interest in 
helping to shape foreign policy is reflective of early propagandists’ attempts that led to 
the early conflicts with State and Defense.  Direct input and discussion of foreign policy 
by USIA leadership was limited to the interagency Operations Coordinating Board, 
which President John F. Kennedy abolished, eliminating the only place where USIA had 
clearly defined policy roles in relation to State and the NSC. 
 When the public learned of the CIA funding of RFE and RL in the early 1970s, 
Congress quickly introduced legislation to reorganize them under a single private 
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corporation, with congressional oversight of funding.  The new Board for International 
Broadcasting (BIB) became the home for RFE and RL as they consolidated operations.  
The Board consisted of five part-time members, chosen by the president with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.  This move cut the direct ties between RFE/RL and the CIA.  
 The one event of greatest importance to VOA during the years of USIA was the 
drafting of a VOA Charter that guides the agencies operations to this day.  This defining 
of broad purposes was the first concrete statement of the principles behind the VOA.  
USIA director George V. Allen charged then-Deputy Director of VOA, Jack O’Brien 
with culling some semblance of a purpose statement from hundreds of pages of agency 
suggestions.  VOA director Henry Loomis, Allen, and O’Brien wisely saw the need to 
create a document that reflected long-term interests of the agency, rather than focusing on 
the Cold War “east vs. west” conflict of the time.  O’Brien came up with a “boil down” 
of the themes he saw repeated, and combined them into a four-paragraph account.70   The 
Charter was initially an executive agency directive, and was passed into law on July 12, 
1976 as Public Law 94-350.71   
 VOA had established a film and television unit in the 1950s, but it had been 
removed to USIA to allow for broader use of its capabilities in 1963.72  Then, in 1983, 
USIA Director Charles Wick launched WorldNet Television as the world’s first global 
satellite network, using the resources of this division.  The system provided content to 
embassies and local TV stations in various countries.  This allowed USIA and VOA to 
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circumvent many local controls imposed by host countries.  An excellent example of this 
is the broadcasting of South African viewpoints that white-controlled state media 
operations would not allow.  Heil says that WorldNet was dominated by Foreign Service 
officers (FSO’s) who believed its purpose was to articulate U.S. foreign policy.73  To 
help resolve this, the Congress passed legislation “applying the VOA Charter, verbatim, 
to WorldNet Television—including its mandate of objective news,”  in 1987. 
 A far more controversial service (then and now) launched in 1985, known as 
Radio Marti.  This service focuses on Cuban listeners.  A strong Cuban -American 
Foundation lobbied Congress for the service.  The service frequently comes under fire in 
appropriations hearings because of an apparent lack of listeners, combined with the 
effectiveness of Fidel Castro’s jamming stations.  Castro’s counteroffensive was/is 
capable of jamming radio stations as far north as Chicago, IL.  Radio Marti may continue 
to operate because of a significant Cuban population in South Florida where the station 
originates, inducing a lack of willingness by members of Congress to close it.  TV Marti 
followed in 1990, broadcasting from an industrial aerostat balloon above the Florida 
Keys.   
 In the 1990s, WorldNet and VOA-TV units moved towards integration.  There 
was a predictable clash between the two cultures, as the news professionals of VOA and 
the policy gurus of USIA quarreled over distribution of resources.  The VOA journalists 
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mistrusted the policy-laden approach of the Foreign Service Officers, and the FSOs were 
wary of the “freewheeling” VOA staff.74   
The Formation of BBG and Separation from State 
 
 At the same time, VOA and its related services were making their final move 
towards independence and permanent status.  In 1993, President William J. Clinton’s 
administration mandated that RFE/RL should remain on the air, despite opposition from 
White House aides.  In July of 1993, Senate Foreign Relations Committee members 
combined VOA, VOA engineering, and the Bureau for International Broadcasting 
(grantor for RFE/RL in 1993) into a single line-item for the first time distinct from USIA.   
 However, VOA did not separate from USIA oversight.  On April 30, 1994, 
Clinton signed the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994.  The act 
established a bi-partisan Broadcasting Board of Governors within USIA “to oversee (1) 
VOA, the Martis, Worldnet [sic] Television, and associated engineering and support 
operations under the new International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), and (2) RFE/RL” as a 
non-federalized, private corporation.75  The Act also created Radio Free Asia (RFA), and 
abolished the BIB.   
 For employees and administrators of VOA, a critical flaw of the Act was the 
abolition of its Charter (P.L. 94-350) by the bill’s language.  The VOA Charter was (and 
is) a shield and “a firewall against bureaucratic and political intrusion into VOA’s 
reporting of the news.”76  Staff and former administrators immediately sought to have the 
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Charter reinstated as a technical amendment to the bill.  The House approved the 
amendment, but the Senate was slow to move.  It was not until October 8 that the Senate 
passed the amendment by voice vote before ending its second session.  Clinton signed the 
reinstated charter (minus language that VOA was the broadcast service of USIA) on 
October 25, 1994, as Public Law 103-415. 
 VOA came under fire in a 1995 House Budget Committee report that proposed 
the closing of over a dozen federal agencies.  The service found friends on both sides of 
the aisle who left it intact.  Twenty-eight employees were released to meet budgetary 
requirements, mostly in Eastern European services.  RFE/RL also was forced to reduce 
its workforce by 800, and relocate its headquarters to Prague, Czech Republic.  Between 
1994 and 1996, VOA, RFE/RL and Radio-TV Marti lost $137 million in budget and 
1,500 broadcast jobs, as hiring began for Radio Free Asia in 1996.  RFA began to 
broadcast on September 29, 1996. 
 Clinton appointed the members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors in 1995.  
As the Board held its first meeting, all U.S. international broadcasting efforts were 
brought under one entity, one only nominally associated with USIA.  The BBG made 
independence a priority, accompanying expansion plans in the Balkan region, and the 
mandated creation of Radio Free Asia.  In late 1996 and early 1997, board members met 
with Senator Jesse Helms and his staff, and stressed “the importance of independence to 
the credibility of the broadcasting entities, federal [i.e., VOA] and grantee [i.e., 
RFE/RL].77  Helms and his aides did not want to create a new bureaucracy while in the 
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process of eliminating others for budgetary reasons.  They also stressed that VOA had to 
retain the official government editorials in order to have a hope of independence.  The 
fact that an “organizationally distinct” office of the International Broadcasting Bureau 
wrote the policy statements made this a viable option for VOA.78   
 On March 8, 1997, USIA director Joseph Duffey appealed to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee to reexamine the authorities of the BBG, with the possibility of 
revisiting the 1994 Act.  Senator Joseph Biden, a strong supporter of the independence of 
the grantees, was absent from the room, but returned very quickly when he heard this.  
He said that he would recommend the return of USIA to State, with all of the 
broadcasters becoming fully independent “under a board whose authorities would remain 
intact.”79  
 In April 1997, the White House signaled its support for a reorganization of the 
foreign affairs programs, including returning USIA to the State Department.  However, 
the future of broadcasting was initially uncertain.  To worsen matters, the House passed a 
bill to put USIA with the BBG back into the State Department.  In June, the bill went to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Jesse Helms and Biden proposed to 
change this plan to place VOA, the Martis, and the surrogates under a separate board.  
Senator Russell Feingold noted that RFE/RL had spent extravagantly during the Bureau 
for International Broadcasting years, with executive salaries as high as $300,000 a year. 
Feingold also was unwilling to create another board and a new agency, while abolishing 
USIA.  He introduced a bill to place all of the radios into the State Department with 
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USIA.  The committee voted against the Feingold Amendment 14-3.  The Helms-Biden 
amendment passed committee and was presented to the full Senate as the 1997 Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.  Biden was primarily interested in maintaining the 
journalistic integrity of the grantees.  Heil notes that VOA was merely “the caboose on 
the independence train.” 
 The Senate defeated a further attempt by Feingold to amend the bill, and passed 
the authorizing legislation.  However, Senate-House conferences lasted for months, and 
refined the 1997 Act to require the continuation of the government editorials.  Additional 
changes included a mandate to develop a “surge” capability during crisis times (discussed 
more in the next chapter), allow use by the Secretary of State of WorldNet TV for “policy 
oriented interactions between overseas embassies and Washington,”80 and establish 
RFE/RL broadcasts to Iraq and Iran.81  Congress stalled the bill while it fought with the 
White House on unrelated policy issues before recessing for the winter.  The conference 
committee report was finally published on March 10, 1998, after Congress reconvened.  
The bill would have lain dormant for much longer, but was tacked onto an omnibus 
appropriations bill, remaining largely unnoticed.  The House passed the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 
(Public Law 105-22), providing for the establishment of the broadcasting services under a 
newly independent BBG, effective October 1, 1999.  The Senate passed the bill, and the 
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president signed it on October 21 of 1998.  Heil states, “Independence [came] at last, ‘on 
little cat feet.’”82
 The Conference Report on the 1998 Act states that the independence of the BBG 
is critical to maintaining the integrity of the journalists, and for providing an “arm’s 
length” approach to governing the broadcasters (Report HR 105-432).  This distance 
provides the State Department or other government official the ability to  deny plausibly 
that she or he has any part in the decision making process behind the programs, and refer 
that person to the BBG.  The report states, in part, “Establishing this structure is not to 
deny that the broadcast entities are funded by the United States government—quite 
obviously, they are.  This structure in no way should be construed to lessen the 
responsibility of the Board to ensure that U.S. broadcasts are ‘consistent with the broad 
foreign policy objectives of the United States . . . .  In truth, the State Department will be 
able to deny responsibility for a specific broadcast—because it will have denied itself the 
ability to directly affect the content of any specific broadcast.’”83  
 A basic assumption of this independence is that the deniability factor provides an 
additional level of protection for the journalists, and helps to improve their credibility 
with the target audience.  To maintain a necessary “dotted line” connection to the foreign 
policy goals of the U.S., the Secretary of State became an ex officio member of the BBG, 
and serves as a consultant in the development and closing of language services.  The 
Inspector General of the State Department was charged with the review of BBG, but the 
law banned an evaluation of the philosophical or political perspectives of any broadcast. 
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 Perhaps the most important aspect of this independence is the capability of the 
broadcasters to provide a “surge capacity to support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives 
during crises abroad.”84  When the BBG was established as a separate entity, no one 
could have predicted the events of September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.  The 
relatively new independence of the broadcast services was tested as the BBG moved to 
develop and implement services for the new strategic interests of the United States.  
Among the new services was an expanded operation to the Middle East and Arabic parts 
of Asia, known as Radio Sawa.  This new RFE/RL-styled service operated with a more 
entertainment-driven format that focused on a mixture of western and Arabic popular 
music.  Some analysts of the addition of another grantee organization have said that it 
was unnecessary, because VOA had to close its own Arabic service to make way for 
Sawa.85    
 Authors have written much about the history of VOA from its earliest days, 
rightly focusing on different periods of the organization’s history, and especially on 
content issues.  The remainder of this work seeks to understand what recent works have 
not clearly stated:  What was the rationale behind folding USIA into State, and leaving 
international broadcasting as an independent agency?  What is the proper position of that 
“firewall” control barrier?  What are the structural and functional issues for the BBG 
going forward?  How might the administrative decisions regarding new services shape 
the VOA in the future?  Ultimately, what should the structure and control of the agency 
look like for best efficiency in meeting the mission and vision of the agency?  
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 The issues of structure and purpose that have faced the government international 
broadcasters of the United States since the early days appear to have originated with a 
disagreement regarding the appropriate strategy for reaching the target audiences, and/or 
a failure to identify the target audience.  VOA and the surrogates have succeeded most 
during times when the purpose was clear and the structure was able to change to fill that 
purpose.  Those times, unfortunately, have also been when the services have broadcast a 
harder tone, similar to the propaganda of the Soviets or Germans.  John Lennon, head of 
the International Broadcasting Bureau’s Office of Performance Review, suggests that the 
purpose of VOA was clear at its beginning in World War II, but became unclear 
following the war, leading to uncertainty about the purpose and necessity of a 
government broadcaster.  This happened again at the end of the Cold War.  Lennon says 
the credit that VOA and RFE/RL received for helping to win the Cold War and the 
VOA’s successes of WWII “contributed to an absence of will on the part of Congress to 
terminate ‘effective at noon tomorrow’ the VOA . . . deciding it would be a Cold War 
anachronism.  And so it perpetuated its existence over a period of time.”86
 There has been renewed fervent discussion regarding the role of a government-
funded broadcaster in public diplomacy since the founding of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors.  Bruce Gregory of George Washington University says that decision makers 
and taxpayers have many forms of statecraft with which to operate, and that the current 
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role of the BBG services is to play a part in the overall strategic communication strategy 
of the United States.  The public diplomacy function of the broadcasters is only one part 
of the equation.  The problem, he believes, is in determining how to make all of those 
parts work together.87  Broadcasting, he says, “has independent organizational status.  It 
has mission statements that vary considerably from the mission statements of other 
actors. But importantly . . . it is a part of public diplomacy that involves a set of norms 
which come out of the world of journalism. . . . It’s the linkage of journalism norms to a 
government-funded activity, which falls within the broad framework of strategic 
communication. . . .”88  
 Broadcasting Board of Governors Chair Kenneth Tomlinson reiterates the need 
for understanding the difference between the advocacy purposes of the State Department 
and the efforts of broadcasters, saying, “We need to understand the importance of 
maintaining the strength of public diplomacy and the traditions of international 
broadcasting.  I am convinced that we will not be successful in our overall mission of 
delivering our message to the world if we fail to grasp that these are two different spheres 
and that they operate according to two different sets of rules.”89   
  The Conference Report accompanying the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act acknowledges these “two sets of rules” when it prohibits the Inspector 
General of the State Department from evaluating broadcast content, though it charges that 
office with the regular audits of the BBG.  “The Inspector General must take great care in 
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reviewing broadcast operations, for, as noted earlier, international broadcasting is not a 
typical government function.  The broadcasters are journalists, and the Inspector General 
must no be involved in second-guessing the daily decisions of journalists and their 
editors.  To do so could have a chilling effect on the activities of the journalists.”90   
 However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) does not separate 
the two sets of rules, treating the State Department and broadcasters as though they share 
an identical mission and purpose: 
While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, 
we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State’s, BBG’s, and other 
federal agencies’ communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy 
complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences.91
 
 Such a strategy is only necessary if the two share an identical function.  The goal 
may be the same, but operational means (i.e., functions) are different.  The public 
diplomacy advocacy and explanation of policy are vested in the State Department, while 
the BBG is solely charged with the explanation of policy and life in the U.S.  Thought no 
interagency strategy on means of achieving the goal is present, there is an attempt at 
consensus, as the broad policies of the BBG are guided by interaction with the State 
Department on areas of significance to national foreign policy.   
 There may be an even deeper problem than not having an interagency strategy on 
mission.  In this same report, the GAO commended the BBG for its “Marrying the 
Mission to the Market” five-year strategic plan, but said that it lacked measurement of 
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progress on long-term goals.92  This lack of visible progress may come from a lack of 
understanding at the agency level what the long-term mission is for the BBG.  As 
Gregory points out, the coordination between agencies and the foreign policy goals of the  
U.S. is episodic and subject to election cycles.93  Meanwhile, the employees often remain 
through the changes.  There is a need for clarity of purpose that transcends election 
cycles, and is perhaps absent from all levels of the agency.  This need for clear direction 
may be a symbol of a larger deficiency in consistent direction on foreign policy that dates 
back to the end of the Cold War.  
  John Lennon says the changing debate about defining purpose and maintaining 
the journalistic integrity of the agency is the key issue for the agency: 
 This is something that has been discussed and debated and agonized over, 
most especially since the advent of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 50s 
when we actually had people committing suicide because their careers had been 
ruined, and heated debate over the extent to which independent free thinking 
journalism should be tolerated within the walls of this government agency.  That 
was why the charter was written. That is why law was passed saying VOA is 
required to report accurate and objective news.  It was a consequence of the 
debate over whether this place was engaging in propaganda – that is to say biased 
reporting in favor of something or against something – that there was a felt need 
to define what the role of VOA was. . . . 
 So the debate currently is the extent to which the United States should 
broadcast anything other than public diplomacy messages to publics abroad that 
do not like this country.  Why should we feed that appetite?  The answer is I 
believe because the guiding principle has always been – certainly, when we were 
broadcasting into the Soviet Union where there were plenty of people who didn’t 
like us – give them the facts, tell them the truth.  Whether they accept it or not is 
up to them, but in any case they will have the information that they need in order 
to decide for themselves.  If you simply present the official line, the message, you 
will have given them nothing of value.  You will only have told them how you  
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feel.  Arguably, they do not need to know how you feel.  They need to know what 
is true.94   
 
 This perspective is a good example of why the surrogate broadcasters may be 
more effective.  If you are able to speak the truth to a targeted nation in an unmodified 
tone, then you may have better success in creating credibility with the listeners.   
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, many within the organization felt a lack of 
direction and purpose following WWII, that was replaced by the fervor (and funding) of 
the Cold War.  John Lennon says that neither the vision nor the mission of the BBG is 
currently entirely clear either, though: 
The BBG would disagree with that. They have, in fact, published a Strategic Plan 
for 2002-2007 . . . and that is fine as far as it goes.95  I would respectfully say that 
this is another example of something written by a committee and it is therefore 
left more as a consensus document than a clear and concise expression of the 
vision for US international broadcasting writ large.  The mission of the place 
continues to be to broadcast on mass media, using the media that people use, to 
transmit messages.  Now, it’s at this point that things become a little hazy in 
contemporary terms because the United States as a country, as a nation, a people, 
has enjoyed favorable status for certainly the last half of the 20th century and 
really until the last five or six years.  During the last period of years, . . . we have 
seen whole populations do an about-face in terms of their respect for the United 
States and the degree to which they are willing to trust the American people.  That 
is a phenomenon that we are unused to.  We have never experienced that before. . 
. .  
 But the key for us here is, what is the extent to which that phenomenon 
has reshaped our vision?  One could fairly say that the vision for the VOA for a 
long, long time was that peoples within our reach would be free, out from under 
the yoke of oppressive regimes, and able to operate in an economic sense 
independently, in other words, to enjoy a free market system of some kind.  Our 
vision now might be stated somewhat differently.  That is to say, those same 
people should operate freely, in a democratic context free of terror and other 
forms of oppression.  But our mission focuses on the terror part.  This 
administration [George W. Bush] now into its second term, for all the obvious 
reasons has made it quite clear that it intends to rub out tyranny, it intends to fight  
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the war on terror, it intends to eliminate despotic regimes in whatever ways it can. 
. . .  And so the mission of the VOA is clear depending on your perspective.  
 Now, if you stand way back and you look at all of that, what it means is 
it’s not possible to say clearly as it once was what the mission of this place is.  
You could look to the VOA charter and the three things that are inscribed there as 
what it is that is important for VOA to do . . . . That constitutes a mission, but one 
could re-examine those three things in the light of modern circumstances . . . . Is 
our mission as striking as it once was?  Some places it is, some places it is not.  It 
is just not as clear . . . . But it is earning the attention and respect of audiences that 
is something that is still incumbent upon us in carrying out whatever revised 
mission we choose to carry out.96   
 
 
 The 2000 BBG Annual Report offers a look at the discovery of purpose after the 
end of the Cold War: 
The creation of an independent BBG also belies arguments that U.S. government-
supported international broadcasting is a Cold War institution whose work is long 
completed. International broadcasting will continue to be vital as long as 
segments of the world’s population are denied access to a free press and as long 
as they hunger for alternative sources of news and information about their own 
countries and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War was not the end of 
history; nor did it end repressive regimes. On the contrary, our mission is 
growing, and we are adapting and improving our methods of delivering news and 
information to people around the globe who live under totalitarian regimes that 
want to control the news media and block out truthful information. 
 
 The BBG’s Executive Director Brian Conniff agrees there has been some 
questioning of the purpose since the end of the Cold War, but does not agree that the 
agency has experienced an identity crisis or lacks strategic direction.  He says that in the 
new War on Terror the BBG has found new vigor: 
There have always been - and continues today and maybe forever - different 
perceptions of what broadcasting’s role is.  And, sometimes it has fairly nuanced 
the difference, the different perceptions, but they can be fairly significant.  We are 
dealing with it right now with the rise of anti-Americanism, low standing of 
America in the world, particularly in key areas.  What is broadcasting’s role, and 
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what is our expectation?  What are we supposed to do?  Are we supposed to 
change people’s minds?  
 
 Conniff says that the BBG returns to the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1994 as the best indicator of congressional intent.  The act 
deliberately separates the advocacy function into the State Department, but leaves the 
journalistic mission with the BBG.  He says that many people in Congress and the White 
House question why the BBG does not serve an advocacy role, while the journalists say: 
 ‘No, we have a journalistic mission in the providing of information, 
accurate news and information, and an explanation of American foreign policy; 
not an advocacy, but an explanation.  That provides the input into somebody’s 
mind to make the right decision about America, and that is the effective way to 
change people’s minds.  Not constantly telling them America’s right, and the 
advocacy of the policy, that is propaganda.  When your deliberate attempt is to 
change the minds, that is propaganda.  We’re not propaganda.’  So we all had the 
same goal, but our methods are different than State Department’s public 
diplomacy. . . .As the world conditions change, we get pressured to have a slightly 
different role, and because of the poll results overseas that showed such a strong 
anti-Americanism, that makes people think, ‘Well, you know, you ought to be 
doing something about it.’  We are, but not necessarily the way they think we are. 
. . . It’s a healthy debate.”97
 
 The debate continues, as the two sides firmly pursue their goals based on 
presuppositions about the nature and effect of international communication.  The VOA 
has pursued the journalistic mission for most of its existence, and so VOA Director David 
Jackson suggests that the BBG flagship’s role has not changed significantly since the 
founding of the BBG and 9-11, saying: 
I do not think the role has changed that much. The role has always been to 
provide objective, reliable, balanced news and information to people who do not 
have access to that.  Secondly, it is to provide an accurate description of what the 
US policies are, and of who Americans are and what we believe in. . . . You 
know, the world is constantly changing and our mission changes with it but the 
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main thing that changes is where we do our mission not how we do it [emphasis 
mine].98   
 
 Lennon says the creation of the BBG caused some difficulties, especially for 
VOA, but led to improvements in VOA’s content, the development of new services and 
expansion into “new” media (the “how” and “where” of broadcasting): 
They [the BBG] had to formulate an agency, create it from scratch using all the 
component parts they had been given.  They had to create Radio Free Asia, which 
became a part of this agency; and they had to sort of bring to heel the Office of 
Cuba Broadcasting, which was something no one had been able to do up to that 
time, and in fact has only really come to pass in the last I would say two or three 
years.  
 VOA found itself gradually diminishing in terms of its stature, within the 
agency, and in terms of its ability to compete effectively as the premiere 
international broadcaster from the United States.  There are a whole lot of reasons 
for this and this is not something that you can blame on the Board even though 
they sometimes do get blamed by VOA.  But in fact, the Board had a 
responsibility to balance the various entities within its purview and make sure that 
all of them functioned effectively.  Inevitably, the biggest one is going to get hurt 
a little bit as resources are bled away.  But for the last five years . . . the BBG has 
been having an increasing impact on VOA . . . by dealing with such critical issues 
as creation of television programming, creation of internet capability, dealing with 
overlapping languages as between RFE/RL and VOA.   
 
 Author Alvin Snyder offers a less flattering reason for the creation of the BBG, 
saying that the BBG is simply an attempt to replace the acronym for the Board for 
International Broadcasting from the Cold War, which served the same purpose as the 
current BBG.  He says it is basically a name change.99  The Board for International 
Broadcasting also served as a firewall and administrator for grantee stations.   
 Despite this criticism, BBG Chairman Ken Tomlinson and the BBG’s five-year 
strategic plan say the journalistic standards applied by BBG services will overcome 
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negative opinions in the target markets and develop the credibility that builds audiences, 
specifically in the Middle East.  Credibility, as Bruce Gregory says, is the “coin of the 
realm”100 in statecraft, and so serving as the “firewall” is perhaps the BBG’s most 
important function.   
The Firewall 
 To establish credibility, the BBG is mandated to act as a “firewall” between the 
government and the broadcasters.  As noted before, the conference report that 
accompanies the 1998 Act states that the consolidation of services under the newly 
independent BBG: 
 Is not to deny that the broadcast entities are funded by the United States 
government—quite obviously, they are.  This structure in no way should be 
construed to lessen the responsibility of the Board to ensure that U.S broadcasts 
are ‘consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States,’ as 
required by . . . the 1994 Broadcasting Act . . . . But the concepts of ‘deniability’ 
and ‘firewall’ are not merely diplomatic fictions.  In truth, the State Department 
will be able to deny responsibility for a specific broadcast—because it will have 
denied itself the ability to directly affect the content of any specific broadcast.  It 
can do so because the ‘firewall’ will have operational meaning.”101   
 
 With this added protection, a diplomat can plausibly deny that he or she has any 
say over content, and refer a disgruntled party to the BBG to address the issue, enhancing 
the credibility of both State and the BBG.  BBG Chairman Kenneth Tomlinson echoes 
this thought, specifically regarding the Middle East Television Network: 
Much of the criticism of Alhurra – again before we even launched – was that we 
would be the mouthpiece of the U.S. Government sending cleared messages and 
propaganda to taint Arab minds.  None of our programming in any part of the 
world seeks to do this.  VOA’s long-standing Charter, and more recently the U.S. 
International Broadcasting Act, guard against this.  But we must demonstrate this 
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every day to our audiences and their trust and loyalty over time.  This does not 
mean that we ignore our mission to promote and sustain freedom and 
democracy.102  
 
 Brian Conniff shares this view, and explains how the Board is responsible for 
balancing the demands of meeting U.S. foreign policy goals and the independence of the 
agency as a firewall: 
It is in our Charter hanging up on the wall there.  It is in the principles and the 
International Broadcasting Act of 94, but those are all just documents.  We live 
and breathe it.  We demonstrate every day that our programming is not 
propaganda, and that it is a reliable source of news and information.  A lot of 
people do come to that conclusion, that we receive government funding, therefore 
‘you’re broadcasting the interests of the US government,’ and we are broadcasting 
the interests of the US government, but only in a very general way.  How we 
handle the individual stories and which stories to cover and how to cover them, 
that is our business.  We do not want the State Department involved.   
 One of my roles here is we are a firewall.  And we talk about this all the 
time, is that somebody from [the Department of Defense], or State Department 
wants us to do a story or spin something, we tell them, ‘You can’t even talk to 
that language service; you can’t pressure them.  You need to come through us, 
and then we’ll decide if it’s journalistically worthy.’  So, it is something you 
prove everyday; it is something that you built up, in VOA’s case, over 60 years.  
Your credibility is as good as your performance.  That is how you demonstrate it, 
and a lot of people will never buy that.103
 
 Many people will never concede that a government-funded broadcaster can have 
true objectivity.  The United States has relied are three degrees of separation between the 
government and the broadcasters: 1) the journalistic charter for VOA; 2) the creation of 
private corporations to serve as surrogate services operating via government block grants; 
3) and the creation of agencies to act as “firewall” protection against direct government 
involvement.  As Brian Conniff explains, the government is involved only in the very 
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broad policy decisions of the BBG, and the agency does not hesitate to enforce the 
firewall: 
Our role is to support American foreign policy.  We would not get taxpayer’s 
money if we were not in support of that, and our priority should be priority 
foreign interests of the United States government.  However, the methodology 
that we use and the methods to push that forward are journalistic, not propaganda.  
Once a year we always go to the State Department, and we get a briefing.  We 
ask, “State Department, you give us your worldwide, regional priorities.”  That is 
input into our thought process.  Which languages do we want to expand?  Which 
ones do we want to cut back?  Our broadcasting should be a reflection of that in 
terms of priorities.  How we do it is our business, program content and all that.  
We are not interested in their suggestions.  But, which countries – yes, we 
certainly we are a reflection of American foreign policy.  No doubt on that.104
 
 However, as the Board does continue to serve as the visible firewall between the 
services and the Congress or other outside influence, Bruce Gregory says there are 
different, possibly less noble ways in which the firewall has been invoked: 
The argument that I think is compelling here is that [regarding] the news product-
-for that matter the program content--I am all for the firewall.  I do not want 
diplomats or elected political leaders trying to shape the news.  I have no problem 
with VOA interviewing Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader after 9-11. . . . But the 
firewall, where it has huge value with respect to protecting those journalism 
norms, it seems to me it’s also been used by broadcasters to fence off what they 
do for budgetary reasons, for turf protection reasons . . . in the sharp elbows give 
and take of Washington politics.  So I give the broadcasters a lot of credit.  When 
the Djerejian advisory panel [on international broadcasting and 9/11] comes out 
with a report, as it did in October 2003, which basically asked good questions – 
and it really was an ‘in your face’ critique – the broadcasters fired back with a 
press release, within 48 hours, [saying] ‘Firewall, firewall, firewall.’105  It seems 
to me that, for a government funded enterprise such as international broadcasting, 
the questions – of what technologies you use, what your priorities are . . . – are 
strategic direction questions, and there the firewall is far less compelling as an 
argument for leaving the whole thing up to a part-time Board of governors.106
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Creation of the BBG and the Effect on Service Structure 
 
 The firewall is maintained between the government and the grantee organizations, 
as well as VOA.  However, the Board seems to feel that the grantee surrogates offer an 
extra step of distance, along with some economic and administrative benefits, including 
improved surge capacity and capability.  Elliott notes that target audiences also are more 
interested in regional or local news than about the Untied States, making the surrogate 
format more desirable in terms of audience share, but less palatable for issues of U.S. 
foreign policy goals.107  The GAO reported in 2004 on the structure of the BBG, saying:   
Each broadcast entity has its own legislated mandate. VOA’s mandate is to (1) 
serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and 
comprehensive source of news; (2) represent America, not any single segment of 
American society, and therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection 
of significant American thought and institutions; and (3) present the policies of 
the United States clearly and effectively and also present responsible discussions 
and opinion on these policies.  In contrast, the role of the surrogate broadcasters 
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio/TV Marti) is to 
replace temporarily the local media of countries where a free and open press does 
not exist.  WorldNet Television and Film Service [now part of VOA] provides 
production and distribution support for television broadcasts developed by VOA 
and the Department of State. The Board’s public diplomacy mandate also includes 
helping to develop independent media and raising journalistic standards where 
possible. 
 
Thus, where a replacement media are needed, a surrogate serves best; where an American 
position is needed, VOA serves best.  Many feel that these two types of service are still 
necessary, but Bruce Gregory says that the “distinction in today’s world is far less 
persuasive, far less compatible . . . . Today, when you have information-rich societies, 
attention is the scarce resource.  And so for attention to be gained in highly competitive 
broadcast markets, you need a much better product.  You need to be highly credible; you 
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need to find ways to be consistently reliable and to provide a value-added in a multi-
channel world, because people can flip a button, turn the dial, channel hop; it is a much 
tougher challenge.  So to have as many different services as broadcasting now has, it 
seems to me weakens the voice of all... Now I appreciate bureaucratic fights that go on in 
broadcasting. . . . I would think there are advantages to collaboration that would outweigh 
the continuing advantage of two services.108  
 Elliott echoes this assessment, noting that the distinction is diminishing, and that 
listenership times do not necessitate two services.  He says, “Combining the broadcasting 
content into one station would require tighter program editing, but, if done skillfully, 
would result in more attractive output without any significant sacrifice of substance. . . . 
In the days of tighter budgets, the United States can no longer afford redundancy in its 
international broadcasting services. . . . This task is difficult enough for one international 
radio station; it becomes almost impossible when U.S. efforts are split between two 
organizations.”109  Competition with local media will also increase as they become more 
capable of high-quality production and content, making the need for maximum efficiency 
almost overwhelming at current budget levels. 
 Proponents of this consolidation suggest the privatization of VOA to provide 
needed economic and administrative efficiencies that are not available in a federal 
service.  The GAO report 04-711T says, ““Board members and senior planners told us 
they encountered some difficulties attempting to work with officials to launch Radio 
Sawa within VOA’s structure and were later forced to constitute Radio Sawa as a 
                                                 
108 Personal interview with Bruce Gregory 
109 Elliott, p. 119. 
 59
separate grantee organization.”110  Though this move may have caused a “further 
fragmentation” of international broadcasting, these alleged “difficulties” may explain the 
propensity of the BBG to develop new services as grantees.  There are several levels of 
unions in the federal structure, both organizational and related to the physical plant of the 
BBG that must clear many actions that occur.  There are also (necessarily) stringent 
guidelines for force expansion and reduction in a federal agency.  This leads to an 
ongoing discussion regarding the privatization of the broadcasters, particularly of VOA.  
However, Brian Conniff says there are no plans in progress to do that:  
People do ask from time to time . . . would Voice of America be more flexible to 
changes in the world situation, does federal policy – personnel policy for instance 
– does that inhibit the ability to be flexible and respond.  Well I suppose there are 
two schools of thought.  Some people think it does, because each time you stop 
one service and then start another service, you have to go through some fairly 
elaborate reduction of force procedures in order to terminate people . . . . So yeah, 
there’s a school of thought that it would be more efficient administratively and 
then the same school of thought is that that distance that is created between the 
government entity and the private non-profit provides the reality and the 
appearance of more journalistic independence, which is one of the reasons why 
RFE was created the way it was and that would be useful to VOA’s credibility.  
So those are the two arguments in favor of it.   
 Other people are concerned that if you got too far removed, then it 
wouldn’t be the VOA, it wouldn’t be representing or articulating American 
foreign policy, and you can’t ask a private corporation to do it the same way as a 
government.   
 
 Tedstrom warned a RAND conference on international broadcasting in 1993 that 
increasing the distance of any service of U.S. international broadcasting from the 
government would jeopardize its future funding.111  The further the service moved from 
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dealing directly with the public and Congress, the more likely would be a reduction in or 
removal of funding    
 Conniff says that the pressing issue is the format that will best serves to maintain 
the independence of the broadcasters without causing a separation, noting that many 
concerned parties discuss consolidation in services and administration more frequently 
now.   
 They will ask, ‘Why is RFE/RL the way it is and why isn’t VOA?  If 
one’s this way, they ought to be the same way.’  Questions have been asked about 
the apparent proliferation of all these organizations, government and grantees, 
why cannot they all be administratively under the same umbrella so you only have 
one procurement department, personnel department, so forth.  That question gets 
asked a lot, particularly when you look at some of the organizations having the 
same service. RFA has a China service, Burmese service, so does VOA.  Radio 
Free Europe has Radio Free Iraq, and then we have Radio Sawa.  They both 
broadcast in Arabic into the same country, and there is some belief that if there 
was a hierarchical structure - administrative structure, decision-making structure - 
that you would be able to deal with those overlaps in a more efficient way. . . . 
You would be able to reallocate your resources in a more efficient way, because 
you may have to take some from here and put it over there in a certain situation.  
If the organization over here is resisting that, which is what typically could 
happen today, then it is harder to do.  But if you had authority that came all the 
way down and was just in a position to say, ‘You will give up those resources, 
and you will receive those, and you will start broadcasting tonight,’ I think the 
belief is the more centralized structure would be more responsive and quicker to 
react.112
 
 Conniff seems to indicate that the core surge capacity of the BBG would be 
improved by such streamlining, moving towards the mandated (and planned) 
improvement in that ability.  Even though the structure may be seen as a barrier to 
efficiency, David Jackson defends VOA’s success as a federally funded entity, and is 
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resistant to privatizing it.  He reinforces the distinction between the VOA mandate and 
that of the surrogates:  
VOA, first of all, is the oldest and largest, by far, of the US international 
broadcasters.  And VOA was created for a specific reason at the time, and that 
was to counter propaganda during the war by being sort of a beacon of truth.  It 
was not to counter propaganda by putting out our own propaganda.  It was a novel 
idea of countering it by being the one place where – whether the news was 
favorable or not – you could rely on what we said. That was a very wise strategy 
because it meant that we won very loyal audiences, which we still have today for 
the same reason.  And it also meant that it made the United States look good for 
providing such a service.  Now, it was a unique creation to have the government 
support an independent journalistic organization.  That was very unusual; it still is 
very unusual, but after 60 years, I think we have shown that it can be done 
effectively. The reputation we have built up over that time shows that these are 
not easy reputations to build for credibility.  You know you have to win that.  You 
do not automatically get granted a respect for being credible. VOA has shown that 
we are independent, that when the news was bad, when the news was 
embarrassing…during Watergate or during the Clinton administration scandals, 
VOA still reported it and people respect the United States for providing 
something like that.   
 We have rigorous sourcing rules, which have been a model for all the 
other international broadcasters.  Every one of them has adopted our standards, 
because they were good ones and they resulted in credible broadcasts.  I believe 
that as long as VOA can show that it can be competitive in a very challenging 
international media marketplace, that we will be a viable and effective 
representative of the United States. . . . There are many different strategies you 
can take to reach out to audiences, and the US should have many different 
strategies and try different approaches.  But the Voice of America approach has 
been effective over a long period of time and that is not easily done.  We have 
shown that we can continue to be effective, even in the era of CNN and other 
international broadcasting competition in the digital age.  We can be nimble; we 
can start programs fast; we can change programming; we can use all the modern 
broadcasting techniques that contemporary broadcasters use.   We can use the 
tools; we are all digital; we have got the internet.  We are very competitive. . . .  
 I do not think we need to create another one like it, because VOA has done 
that. But I do think it is viable.  A large part of the reason for that is thanks to the 
charter, which the BBG supports and defends.  They are the firewall that protects 
us, that protects our independence.  It was a tribute to the President and the 
Congress that they gave VOA the freedom to be independent, and I believe that 
VOA has lived up to that responsibility.113
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 The caveat emptor to the idea of journalistic independence as defended by the 
agency and its members and congressional supporters comes from Wasburn.  In his view, 
“By obscuring recognition that news accounts inherently embody some perspective that 
supports political interests, the professional ideology of Western media organizations 
denies that they in fact have an identifiable perspective.  Hence, it denies the very 
possibility of congruence between the perspectives of the news organization and 
government.  However, it is precisely this congruence that accounts for the historical 
infrequency of direct intervention of Western governments into the news-making 
activities of their international broadcasting organization.  That is, Western governments 
tend not to censor, not because they are inhibited by cultural norms or by the legal 
provisions of charters from intervening in the affairs of organizations that broadcast ‘the 
truth’ to the world, but because they seldom have any real need to do so.”114  By this 
view, the firewall is not normally necessary, nor is the claim to “objective” journalism.  
The point of having a firewall, though, is either the reinforcement of independence when 
the broadcasters most need it, such as when a congressional resolution comes under direct 
fire by a member of that organization's editorial staff, or to obscure government 
involvement in a broadcast station. 
 David Jackson’s appeal to the record of the VOA as a viable entity, even as a 
federal service, bolsters the position that the privatization of VOA would serve merely 
economic and administrative efficiencies, rather than providing any sort of improvement 
in quality, distribution, or listenership.  The need to be faster and more responsive in 
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crises is part of the Board’s mandate to shore up its surge capacity, so that it can 
effectively respond to crises in U.S. foreign policy by increasing broadcasts to a 
particular part of the world on very short notice.  As an example of this capability, the 
2001 BBG Annual Report highlights its rapid deployment, or “surge” into Afghanistan 
and Iraq following the 9-11 attacks.   
 Bruce Gregory explains the challenge of developing the surge capability that the 
BBG hopes to gain by privatizing its services and streamlining VOA: 
I think it is a tough challenge.  Very tough challenge.  We are always surprised 
that the best minds in the U.S. government did not predict the Korean War, did 
not predict the Cuban missile crisis, did not predict the South Asian nuclear tests, 
did not  predict 9-11.   There are a lot of things we did not predict. . . .  
 [One recommendation of the Defense Science Board] is to provide a way 
to tap into language skills, communication skills, when you need it, on a ‘just-in-
time’ kind of  basis.   I think that sounds good in theory.  It might be a lot harder 
to do if all of a sudden you need a sophisticated broadcasting operation in a heart 
language, which you are not broadcasting in now.  Just to go from a standing start, 
doing that, is a tough question. Having said that, you still have the question of the 
extent to which broadcasting is the most effective way for a government to 
communicate in the society.  And I think you could find arguments that your 
money could have been spent on other things in some societies.115
  
The Future 
 With the continuation of the debates over content and scarce resources that have 
followed the VOA and BBG through their respective histories, Brian Conniff talks about 
how the BBG could be made more responsive to changes in system needs,  
We get frustrated when there is a crisis and we do not have the surge capability, 
by the time you go through the long, involved budget process, the crisis is over, so 
we have asked to have a contingency fund.  We have never gotten it, you know.  
Congress hates to give you money unless they know exactly what you are going 
to do with it.  But something like that would be an interest to have the ability to 
respond quicker when there is a crisis because the budget process is just slow, and 
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onerous, and not very responsive.  We need to make sure we have a structure that 
is responsive, that allows the single chain of decision making to work so [if] we 
need to eliminate something over here and move it over there, that we can do it, 
and it is hard to do that.  It is really hard when you have this mish-mash of 
government and private companies.  It is not just one private company, it is 
multiple private companies.  Even though the board members sit on all of them - 
which is an attempt on Congress’s part to make decision making a little cleaner.  
You know how it works when you have either a corporate or a bureaucratic 
structure, they resist those movements and those decisions.  We are trying to 
eliminate Radio Free Iraq, believing that between Alhurra and Sawa, there is 
adequate Arabic language going into Iraq. RFE/RL, which houses Radio Free 
Iraq, they believe that they still have a viable mission and they want to keep it 
going.  So there is an internal resistance to what the Board wants to do.  Those 
problems occur from time to time.  So, coming up with a cleaner structure of 
something that maybe would help us be a little more responsive and allow us to 
deal with this inability to get money from Congress quickly is maybe we need to 
find a more streamlined way of reallocation internally.  That may be the one 
answer to Congress not giving us a contingency plan.  So, in general we need to 
be more efficient and effective and one way of addressing it is to look at all these 
different organizations and see if there is a way to pull them closer together.116  
 
 In the enduring battle for hearts and minds, there is another key issue, and that is 
the reaching of target audiences by these services.  Without listeners, all of the political 
wrangling and internal struggle is pointless.  John Lennon addresses the issue of reaching 
the target audiences by suggesting the BBG needs to figure out who the audience is 
supposed to be: 
 The challenge that lies ahead for us is in the logistics of understanding and 
selecting target audiences.  That’s key.  Why bother, why should we do all that?  . 
. . Why not just throw a signal up on short wave and do what we have always 
done?  . . . First, the world is listening to short wave in declining numbers even in 
expansive areas like Russia and Africa and China.  They gave up on short wave 
decades ago in Latin America.  Those people listen to FM, but mainly they watch 
television.  That’s part of the second deal that we have to contend with; the 
VOA’s principal challenge ahead is going to be engaging smartly, affordably and 
effectively audiences using new media . . . . There are some very fundamental 
challenges that have nothing to do with content of programming and everything to 
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do with technology and delivery.  Those are issues that we have to grasp long, 
long before we can compete. . . . 
 The Board has not caused all of the problems that the VOA currently 
faces.  The events have dictated some of the changes that have had to take place, 
but what the Board has done . . . is that it has caused certain things to be dealt 
with by the VOA that VOA had never had to deal with before.  VOA has had to 
shape its programming goals according to target area research.  There has never 
been a history of that here prior to the last five years.  Never.  Had not happened 
since 1942.  There had always been this separate agenda. . . . Instead, now the 
Board has said ‘Here’s a pile of data and we now know more about how people 
feel in Pakistan than we ever did before and we expect you to respond to that.’ . . . 
So we’ve got new disciplines that have been imposed on VOA by the Board of 
Governors over the last five or six years that it hadn’t had to embrace previously, 
and that has been a very, very difficult – and in some cases genuinely painful – 
adjustment for them to make.  I will tell you, from my perspective they have not 
made it completely, not by a long shot.  It is going to take at least another half a 
dozen years I think before they can say they have done it. . . .  117
 
David Jackson does not totally disagree with this idea, but explains how program content 
is a tremendous challenge going forward for VOA: 
Well, I think the biggest challenge facing VOA is the same one facing every 
broadcaster in the world, and that is to be competitive in an increasingly 
competitive marketplace.  Audiences, even in developing countries, have more 
and more choices, and it is very challenging, it is very hard to get their attention. 
Whether you are VOA or whether you are a local broadcaster, we all are fighting 
for those audiences, and to reach them, we have to be really good.  We have to 
have good programs.  They have to be professionally produced, they have to be 
interesting, and they have to provide them something that they’re not getting 
somewhere else . . . . So we are increasingly focusing on that kind of content, 
which is not only of interest to those audiences, but it also fulfills our vision.   
 Another challenge is being on the medium that people use.  Currently that 
is increasingly television. . . . We’re still pushing; we’re still expanding in 
television, but in the future it’s going to be more and more on the internet, and we 
already have a web presence in every one of our languages. But that may also lead 
to other devices.  It may lead to text messaging.  It may lead to things that have 
not been invented yet.118
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 Grand and nebulous as these aspirations may sound, the idea of “web presence” 
indicates only that there is at least one page, or portion of a page, devoted to a given 
language service.  It does not indicate a multi-page “website” devoted to each one.   
 As VOA expands into the costly world of TV and the Internet, longstanding 
services are being reduced.  The BBG says of its budget proposal for FY 2007: 
 Faced with the increased costs of expanding critically needed television 
and radio programming to the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world, the Board has 
had to make some painful choices.  
 “Every member of the Board of Governors regrets the loss of VOA 
services proposed in this budget," Tomlinson said. "The men and women who 
provided these services for many years served with distinction and provided 
programming that were critical to this nation's interests. However, the Board 
believes that the priorities reflected in this budget proposal represent the best 
allocation of funds.” 
 
 Tomlinson also says, “The competitive edge in the Middle East is our dedication 
to truth and free and open debate.  We will provide an example of democracy and a free 
press in a media market dominated by sensationalism and distortion.”119  The shift in 
emphasis to the Arab and Muslim areas of the world demonstrate clearly the foreign 
policy goals of the United States and the impact those goals have on the direction of the 
BBG and its services.  Even with a nearly $672 million budget, resources are said to be 
scarce.  Several of the remaining eastern European services are being cut, or reduced to 
TV and internet only.  Shortwave efforts are being cut back substantially, as fewer people 
rely on that medium to get their news, pushing the “old ways” of doing international 
broadcasting into retirement, along with the people who made it work. 
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 The purpose for VOA and other services serves as the validation for their 
existence.  Therefore, discovery of the purpose should lead to a discussion about how the 
structure can serve to achieve the purpose.   
 The current administrators seem to feel that the broad purpose changes very little 
for the international broadcasters when the world situation changes.  The debate over the 
purpose of the U.S. international broadcasters has occurred since the earliest days of 
1942, when VOA officially went on the air.  The conflict has always been over whether 
the broadcasters should advocate for the American position, or if they should tell 
America’s story to the world.  Many early leaders of the parent organizations felt that the 
function of broadcasting was to advocate for the American position as a true propaganda 
agency, and were convinced that it was their job to help shape foreign policy.  Others felt 
that the journalistic norms of the free press should be imposed to help build credibility 
with foreign audiences.  This position places the job of telling America’s story on the 
staff of the services.  John Lennon perhaps has stated the clearest critique of the search 
for purpose, by saying that the role of the services is clear, depending on your 
perspective.  If the administrators and board feel that the direction of the agency should 
be towards a propagandistic, edgy tone, then they will seek to direct the agency in that 
direction, etc. 
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 Several groups already discussed in this paper suggest that the international 
broadcasters should be returned to a position with significant input on national security 
and foreign policy issues, leading to an advocacy mission.  For example, the Public 
Diplomacy Council’s “Call for Action on Public Diplomacy” recommends a cabinet-level 
position for public diplomacy officials, including broadcasters.  This is exactly what the 
early propagandists wanted to do, to have a place in shaping U.S. foreign policy.  This 
seems appealing at first glance, but the broadcasters are non-elected and (mostly) non-
appointed civilian employees of an executive agency, hired to be content producers. 
Broadcasters should not serve as shapers of foreign policy; they are reactive to it.  The 
BBG Strategic Plan notes the purpose of a public diplomacy broadcaster is to spread a 
predetermined message to a predetermined area via mass media and other channels 
controlled by that broadcaster as much as possible.  The public diplomacy broadcaster is 
to be a receiver of guidance on overall policy, not the creator of it.  The broadcaster then 
searches to find all of the facts on a topic, and creates content to present the balanced 
story.  That facet of broadcasting and journalistic norms allows the agency to remain 
independent; if it were a policy creator, it would have to be brought under more direct 
oversight, sans firewall, and at the expense of credibility.   
 Another view says that, if the broadcast services are an agent of public diplomacy, 
then they should fall into the State Department realm.  History has demonstrated that 
State has not liked broadcasters, and vice versa, specifically in regards to policy 
decisions.  That is part of the reason for the independence of BBG when USIA folded 
into State.  The State Department and the BBG do coordinate efforts on some 
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programming, such as community health or agriculture, which is not propaganda in any 
sense other than as a goodwill ambassador. 
 The needed policy input comes in the form of the BBG receiving its report 
annually from the State Department on what State feels the BBG’s primary target areas 
should be for a given time.  Thus, the BBG is a receiver of information via a one-way 
valve from the executive, and so it should be.  There is nothing particularly preparatory in 
the training of journalists or broadcasters that would equip them with special knowledge 
regarding foreign policy.   
 As suggested, proponents of the idea tend to be those who want the BBG and 
VOA to advocate for the American position.  All of these groups are careful to separate 
international broadcasting from other public diplomacy functions, but still group it 
together with “strategic communication” initiatives, which would ultimately return 
control of the broadcasters to State.  Proposals to create a Cabinet-level position, or some 
sort of advisory commission to oversee public diplomacy information campaigns, are an 
attempt to bring the BBG services again under more direct authority of the government.  
This is emphasized when the Djerejian committee report says that all international 
broadcasting should be brought under a new advisory board, except for the news 
function.  This movement of the firewall is one of many suggestions for restructuring of 
the agency.  However, it seems that anyone who attempted to bring the news function 
under direct control would kill the deal; to the Congress and the broadcasters, the 
journalism protections are mandated and sacrosanct.  This suggests that the current level 
of input is a positive result of the BBG structure. 
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 Most students of the BBG seem to feel that the purpose of the BBG services is to 
demonstrate a free press system to countries where no such free press.  In the early days, 
the VOA was to “tell America’s story” to the world, while the surrogates broadcast more 
local and regional news and (sometimes) incited revolution or reform by advocating for 
the American position.  The difference between the surrogate and federal, as Bruce 
Gregory notes, is not as compelling as it once was, because no one is playing innocent 
that these services are funded by the U.S. government.  Thus, progress toward 
privatization of all BBG services could be a positive move for the BBG, allowing it a 
greater freedom in matters of personnel and administration.   
 Until such changes occur, the federal and grantee services should never compete 
on purpose.  This means that unified policy guidance may be necessary throughout the 
organization.  If a strident tone is needed by a grantee, it should not conflict severely with 
a federalized services need for guidance.  If the goal is to tell the truth as the BBG asserts, 
then it must tell the truth, even if it is in strident tones.  A BBG policy office would be the 
way to do this, as opposed to individual ones at each surrogate service and the IBB.  
Here, the firewall does not move, but policy decisions are vested firmly at the federal 
level. 
 Some would say this creates the monolithic problems associated with State 
Department supervision, i.e., very slow policy guidelines that delay operations.  To 
address this, policy from the BBG level could come in the form of an annual report that 
would follow the meetings with the State Department to hear their goals for the year.  
This would allow the BBG to provide broad guidance, leaving the day-to-day decisions to 
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the locals, subject to the review process.  The BBG is, after all, supposed to be only a 
part-time board, though the current board has subsumed much of the operational control 
of the agency under its direct supervision, poking holes in the firewall. 
 I suggest that VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, and MBN are now primarily content 
providers.  If they became solely content providers, then I would structure the IBB to 
become a purely technical branch of the BBG, overseeing the acquisition of materials 
(transmitters, etc.), time on affiliates (OMPP), and administration of the physical system.  
A new office at the BBG level would be in charge of coordinating efforts between the 
IBB and the services (a liaison) in terms of the physical system.  All services would be 
responsible for their own personnel choices - something that is allowed in the grantee 
model, but is currently handled by the IBB on the federalized side.  Since they would be 
merely content providers and not responsible for the transmission, they would be 
separated a step further.  This effectively moves the firewall to the IBB level.  The IBB 
would be absorbed as an office of the BBG, with many or all of its present functions 
intact.  However, all current IBB oversight functions would be moved into the BBG 
offices.  This move would probably force the privatization of VOA, since its overall 
structure would closely resemble that of the current grantees. 
 Once the individual components became content providers and the physical 
system was owned and operated by the U.S. government, VOA and the grantees would 
bid contracts for program content, pitching ideas to the BBG, with the best ideas awarded 
development contracts in the way the TV networks do.  This would create an internal 
competition that would improve quality, but also keep the material fresh and competitive 
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in local broadcast markets.  Annual reviews of programs (not channels) would result in 
contract extensions or in calls for new ideas.  Without doubt, this could result in the 
elimination of one or more privatized services if performance was not consistently up to 
the standards of the other services.   
 In reading the BBG’s FY 2005 Performance Annual Review (PAR) report, there 
appear to be advantages for having all grantee organizations: \1) the administrative 
efficiencies which a non-federal corporation has, namely in the hiring and/or firing of 
personnel; 2) the starting and stopping of a given service without normal force reduction 
procedures; 3) and the extra distance provided from the government to the broadcaster.  . 
 There is no longer a need for stridently toned services and a federalized service 
that speaks more politely within the BBG structure.  The attachment of services to their 
funding is readily traceable, unlike in the early days of RFE/RL.  Thus, having a grantee 
that seeks to be a surrogate service and agitate for revolution no longer provides plausible 
deniability for the government, State or otherwise.  It does not matter if the day-to-day 
operation of the service belongs to the service, if the government (and the BBG is a 
government executive agency) ultimately controls its policy goals.  The Congress would 
pull funding in an appropriations minute if it found the BBG to be operating outside of 
the broad policy interests of the U.S.  The focus on Muslim countries and Arabic 
populations exposes the level at which this “broad policy guidance” intervenes in 
language service choices.  It may be broad guidance, but it is firmly in control of the 
basic decisions of the BBG.  For example, the BBG has cancelled services in several 
eastern European countries where a U.S. presence could meet long-term strategic 
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interests, in order to meet short-term demands of the “War on Terror” currently 
underway.  We have spent years and billions of dollars in earning the respect and trust of 
these audiences, and often leave them in a tumultuous political climate when we close 
their language service.   
 Continuing to broadcast in overlapping language services creates competition and 
encourages innovative thinking within U.S. broadcasters.  If this method continues, the 
services should be funded at competitive levels, i.e., appropriations of performance 
bonuses for language services that clearly demonstrate that they are meeting the mission 
of their entity and the board.  The VOA Arabic service may have performed just as well 
as Sawa if it had been funded at the same level, with the same program content and the 
same technical support. 
 If consolidation does occur, the complementary services of VOA and grantees 
should be day parted to meet audience desires when they would most likely to listen.  
Consolidating into a single service could mean the improved performance of the whole 
unit.  If this occurs, a single brand name would make worldwide marketing more efficient 
and effective.  Branding all products with the VOA moniker would mean that it came 
from America, and all services would be merely independent content providers.  VOA 
would be merely a central brand, while the content production for everything else would 
be left to the private entities.  An example of this would be a product produced by 
RFE/RL that would proclaim at its end, “This is a production of RFE/RL for the Voice of 
America!”  Both get credit, but the central brand increases its exposure. 
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 When discussion begin about the privatization of VOA, there seems to be a 
prevailing fear among legislators, a-partisan, that the “other guys” will get control of the 
private organization, leaving the first group unable to overcome the legislative block on 
interfering.  This may lead to a lack of will on the part of any Senator or member of 
Congress to attempt the privatization.  Any direct influence has been precluded by the 
legislation enabling the BBG to act as a firewall between Congress and the constituent 
services. 
 The firewall is a matter of perception.  Structurally, the Congress should have no 
direct immediate input into programming decisions or news topics.  To do so, according 
to the Strategic Plan, would stifle the journalists into self-censorship.  Thus, the Congress 
(judiciary and executive also) is removed a step from the decision-making process.  
However, the decision-making process is influenced by State, and Congress holds the 
purse strings to make the agency bend to its will.   
 Those who invoke the firewall are very often attempting to engage in a turf war 
that has consumed more than its share of good ideas.  This war has frustrated the efforts 
of managing agencies throughout the years of the VOA.  Sherwood, Warburg and Barnes 
left because they wanted to use VOA as an attack weapon in the war of ideas, while the 
Congress (which then had oversight) wanted an externally motivated service that would 
tell others in the world about America.  Most recently, infighting over changes in VOA 
Arabic led to the creation of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks of Radio Sawa, al 
Hurra TV and Radio Free Afghanistan, all as private grantee corporations. 
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 However, the grantee structure is also a matter of creating perception.  The BBG 
is a bipartisan committee, appointed by the president, with a balanced membership, with 
the chair predictably a member of the executive party at the time.  These board members 
oversee the operations of VOA, and are required by law to sit on the boards of the 
grantees.  This is a bit of obfuscation of control, and that is all it is.  If the same members 
oversee VOA as oversee the grantees, then they are under one and the same leadership.  
Again, they are separate in name only.  This leads to the conclusion that the 
organizational structure should thus be the same for all types of service.   
 Some suggest this is not necessarily the case, because the goal of BBG services is 
to demonstrate how a free press system works, which can be difficult with a government-
funded system.  To ensure that the service remains on the air and is not abandoned 
because of commercial media constraints (i.e., no financial return on investment), the 
government should fund a service, but should have no say in its day-to-day content.  
Thus, the “broad policy guidance” should be broad in the broadest sense, meaning that 
individual language service decisions should be made by the services, not by the 
government.   
 There is still a need for a services charged with the same mission as the Voice of 
America, because America still needs a voice by which it can communicate with the 
peoples of the world in a direct manner.  It is still the most vital component of U.S. 
international broadcasting.  It would not and should not work as a true propaganda 
agency, to retain credibility with an audience.  However, if the government tells the truth, 
why does it matter if it directly or indirectly funds the service?  Perhaps it is because of 
 76
an innate mistrust of the target audiences for what governments have to say.  Why would 
they trust what they know to be the words of their own government and not those of 
another government?  Why would they trust an indirectly funded program more than one 
that is directly funded?  Since the distinction seems to lack force since the end of the 
Cold War, then the continuation of grantees should be for content distance, personnel 
efficiencies, and administrative streamlining.  If BBG services clearly express the fact 
that they are funded and guided by the government, and people still give them such high 
marks for accuracy, objectivity, and trustworthiness, then there is no need for a surrogate 
service to hide its identity.   
 The greatest reason for maintaining a firewall between the government and the 
journalists is if the journalists are of a different opinion than the government.  This 
protects dissident voices in its best incarnation, and protects subversives in its worst, i.e., 
McCarthy’s investigation.  There must be some level of distinction at which subversives 
are removed from the agency, without creating the negative environment of the 1950’s. 
 There is a continuing question of whether any or all of the stations should air 
official policy editorials.  One argument is that the government is providing funding for 
the stations, and the editorials are delineated clearly as being the opinion of the 
government, therefore all stations should air them.  These editorial remarks are clearly 
propaganda (truth-value undetermined), and occur next to programs and coverage that 
may suffer a credibility loss by accompanying official U.S. statements.  However, the 
question remains as to whether or not the loss of credibility overwhelms the gain of 
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informing elites and the general population about the specific position of the U.S. 
government.   
Surge Capacity 
 One of the most baffling aspects of the operation of the international broadcasters 
is the mandate to shore up their surge capacity and capability.  This quick startup of a 
service in a target area is to meet a short-term interest of foreign policy, such as pre-war 
Iraq.  VOA has an awkward relationship with its unions that makes this very difficult, 
and is the reason for the privatization of the Radio Sawa.   
 One option for overcoming this would be to incorporate an activating clause in 
the legislation continuing appropriations for the services.  This activating clause would 
temporarily, and for a defined period, bypass the normal constraints of the BBG Act, 
remove the firewall, and allow for a direct command from the top of the chain to the 
service with the nearest technical surge capability.  The top of this chain would be the 
BBG chair, acting on an executive order that is limited severely in its burden to prove 
that such a direct command is necessary.  This command could only address WHERE the 
broadcasters go, not WHAT they transmit.  This would be an emergency powers kind of 
thing, with a definite end period (6 months, 2 years, etc.).  The order would be initiated 
by the Secretary of State with the approval of the President via an executive order.  The 
danger in doing this is that tinkering with the enabling legislation could lead to a 
restructuring of services by overzealous legislators who have no direct authority over this 
executive agency. 
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 Another suggestion is that the military should be in charge of the surge capacity 
function, moving into captured areas or strategic areas to set up stations and take over 
transmitters.  Once the situation was resolved to a more peaceful level, or when the 
military uses for the station were through (i.e., the end of full engagement of forces), the 
BBG services could be brought in on the same frequencies and help with the rebuilding 
efforts.  This would not remove BBG services from their pre-engagement status (as in the 
case of RFE’s early days) in the battle for hearts and minds.  There is a surge capacity in 
the sense of the ideological war, and then there is a sense synonymous with Wild Bill 
Donovan’s using news “as guns fire bullets.”  The military already conducted broadcasts 
into Iraq prior to the invasion, though Norm Pattiz and others claim that the military 
failed miserably in their attempts. 
 Perhaps the best suggestion is that of Brian Conniff, by which the Congress would 
provide BBG with an emergency or contingency fund to allow one-time startup costs for 
surge stations and reallocation procedures.  Use of this fund would have to demonstrate 
clearly  that the new target area was indeed a priority in the foreign interests of the United 
States.  Unused money would be rolled into the next fiscal year’s budget to help pay for 
budget increases for the BBG. 
The Future 
 The arguments over the purpose of VOA and the BBG will rightly continue into 
the future, as the agency seeks to balance the foreign policy demands and journalistic 
norms mandated by its founding legislation.  At any time, the majority party or 
administration will have its ideas of how to improve services, or have a strong desire to 
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have its own perspectives dominate the airways.  The maintenance of the firewall is 
therefore an absolute necessity.  This protection of the day-to-day operations of a free 
press serve as a best means of gaining credibility among target audiences, and of making 
them desirous of such freedoms.   
 The purpose of all of the services is to exhibit how a free press works.  However, 
they also must all tell America’s story to the world.  This can be accomplished by more 
than producing features and news stories about America (the current VOA role), but by 
simply telling the truth, which we believe is our perspective.  The difference between this 
and a true propaganda organization is that the truth-teller can admit when he/she has 
made a mistake; the propagandist must continue to spin the lie. Admitting a mistake adds 
credibility to other things that are said by the broadcasters.   William Harlan Hale’s 
famous words ring true again today, “For us the news may be bad.  For us the news may 
be good.  We shall tell you the truth.” 
 To meet this purpose, the structure of the BBG must be flexible enough to change 
as quickly as it can, while maintaining a firm footing in its founding legislation and stated 
goals.  The BBG must continue to streamline its operations to meet budgetary demands, 
while shoring up its surge capability.  This means that at any given time there are 
resources not available to current services because of the possibility for a need to surge 
somewhere else.  Thus, the contingency fund should be approved for the BBG, with the 
cost of starting up a regional network, including radio, TV, Internet, and other 
distribution technologies.  As several committees and professional groups have 
suggested, the funding for the international broadcasting function should be in 
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accordance with the size of our world presence, not as a “Hegemon”120 but as a clear 
Voice of America. 
General Observations 
 Generally, there must be agenda setting at some level, because not everything that 
happens in the world can be reported.  Thus, whether the journalistic mission or advocacy 
mission prevails, both may defend themselves by claiming objectivity.  The federalized 
service hopes to influence people and change minds by focusing on the news and 
lifestyles of the United States, or reporting the news of the world from a free press 
perspective.  They claim objectivity because of the environment in which they operate, 
where their decisions and articles are edited by superiors, rather than by government 
officials seeking to tone down the work.  However, inherent personal bias causes the 
“objective” reporter to focus on certain topics and sources, to the exclusion of others.  
Thus, the agenda that is set may be unintentional, but still exists. 
 The difference with a surrogate broadcaster is that the agenda is set clearly from 
the foundation of the organization.  RFE was founded to attack the communist ideology 
of Russia as evidenced in its satellite countries.  The agenda was to do anything that 
would promote reform or outright revolt within the countries, without the need for 
portraying the United States’ perspective.  The tone of these stations was harsh because 
the agenda was set to confront directly an ideology. 
 What we have here are semantic issues.  The agenda is set either way.  Whether it 
is called “objectivity and demonstration of a free press” or “propaganda” does not make a 
                                                 
120 This is author Orson Scott Card’s word for the hegemonic ruling body of the galaxy in the classic book 
Ender’s Game. 
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difference in the core issue.  The goal is to win hearts and minds to favor the transmitting 
nation or group.   
 I think that the battle comes to a showdown between theories of persuasion and 
media effects.  Though most communications scholars would balk at suggesting the 
average viewer is directly and powerfully influenced by every program they watch, many 
of the population in general seem to feel that the media have a very powerful, direct 
impact on the listener or viewer.  Many scholars would accept that there are times when a 
message will make a bigger impact, and sometimes that is through the periphery of our 
conscience.  This may explain what happened in Germany with the people who 
knowingly supported Hitler’s takeover bid for the world.  It was not that they were duped 
into doing something they were unwilling to do, but that they were influenced by a 
medium that increased the salience of an issue with which they were already in accord.  
Ergo, the pizza commercial at dinnertime is the most effective because it increases the 
salience of the Pizza Hut at a time when hunger is beginning to be an issue for the 
viewer.  A demonstration of this (though not entirely causally linked) is the sudden 
increase of viewers and listeners to U.S. international broadcasting prior to, during, and 
immediately following an attack by the U.S. or its increased involvement in an area.   
 If this is true, then the numbers for Radio Sawa immediately upon its 
establishment are not nearly so impressive when compared to the long-term numbers of 
VOA-Arabic.  Numbers increase because salience of content increases. If the people of 
Iraq and Afghanistan are only listening because we have a military presence in their area, 
they will stop listening as soon as the threat that we will bomb their house subsides.  
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They may also be listening because they want to compare what they hear on local media 
with the BBG services and our Armed Forces networks.  Another reason for the rise in 
listenership numbers may be that the people are lying to surveyors, whom they may see 
as spies for the U.S. forces, or as general authority figures.  Thy may then acquiesce to 
what they think the surveyor wants to hear (“Please don’t kill me; I listen to your 
station!”) 
 I must reiterate that, if we are telling the truth, there is no reason to be wary of 
having a true propaganda agency, promoting the ideas of our nation as a good way to 
improve the quality of life for developing countries.  The main concern of having such an 
agency is a fear that the “other guys” will have control of it at the “wrong” time.  This 
may be addressed by the very factor that encourages instability in the organization: the 
political appointment of top officials by the President.  The leadership and direction of 
the agency tend to shift with each director.  However, the pressure that slows change—
normally seen as a bad thing—helps to keep the general direction of the agency aligned 
with the direction of the country. 
 Future and ongoing research should study the long-term ideology of news and 
features programming at the Voice of America and the other constituent services of the 
BBG in whatever future form it may take.  The Inspector General of the State Department 
is not able to do this, but at least the academy should be aware of how much “objectivity” 
and “freedom of the press” are mantras not necessarily based in “bald fact.”121 This urges 
a quantitative analysis of substance and tone of BBG programming.
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